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Abstract 
Joint attention—the ability to coordinate attention to an object or 
event—is a key feature of human social cognition. Without joint attention, we 
would not be the cooperating species we are now. Most developmental studies 
focus on when joint attention emerges, rather than what joint attention actually 
is, and what consequences it has for different types of interactions. To address 
this gap, Part I of the thesis provides a new look at joint attention, presenting a 
systematic framework of four attention levels (from monitoring, to common, 
mutual, and shared attention) with corresponding distinctions for the 
knowledge states associated with each level. Cognitive, behavioral, and 
phenomenological aspects of the different levels are discussed, as well as the 
functions and consequences the levels have in terms of what kinds of 
obligations they can support. 
Part II of the thesis follows on from this in investigating the role of joint 
attention in facilitating coordination. In two studies, 5- to 7-year-old children 
played a Stag Hunt coordination game in which they needed to decide whether 
to cooperate or play individually. During the decision-making phase, the 
children’s partner either shared attention with them—she made ostensive, 
communicative eye contact—or looked non-communicatively at them. In Study 
1, results showed that communicative looks produced an expectation of 
cooperation in children. In Study 2, children normatively protested when their 
partner did not cooperate, thus showing an understanding of the 
communicative look as a commitment to cooperate. This is the first 
experimental evidence, in adults or children, that in the right context, 
communicative, but not non-communicative, looks can signal a commitment. 
Thus the thesis highlights the special importance of the shared attention level 
in supporting cooperation. 
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Preface 
“Momentarily he caught O’Brien’s eye. O’Brien had stood up. He had taken off 
his spectacles and was in the act of resettling them on his nose with his 
characteristic gesture. But there was a fraction of a second when their eyes met, 
and for as long as it took to happen Winston knew—yes, he KNEW!—that 
O’Brien was thinking the same thing as himself. An unmistakable message had 
passed. It was as though their two minds had opened and the thoughts were 
flowing from one into the other through their eyes. ‘I am with you,’ O’Brien 
seemed to be saying to him. ‘I know precisely what you are feeling. I know all 
about your contempt, your hatred, your disgust. But don’t worry, I am on your 
side!’ And then the flash of intelligence was gone, and O’Brien’s face was as 
inscrutable as everybody else’s.” 
 - George Orwell, 1984, p. 22  
 
 
“Only connect!”  
- E.M. Forster, Howards End, p.134 
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1. General introduction 
The ability to experience the world together with others is a key feature of 
human life. It allows us to shift from solitary, private, and individual existence to 
shared, communal, and interconnected existence. We engage with each other in a 
large variety of ways: we share our perceptions, emotions, and thoughts. When we 
grasp, attune to, influence and share mental states, we engage in shared 
intentionality; we can experience the commonality of our mental states about 
something with others and focus on things together (Bratman, 1999; Searle, 1995; 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tuomela, 1995). We could not have conversations, 
collaborate with co-workers, teach others, cook with friends, or play with children 
without shared intentionality. It enables us to successfully coordinate our actions 
with others in diverse settings. Shared intentionality allows us to coordinate concrete 
actions in small-scale activities, to coordinate our decisions and even to coordinate 
on a more abstract level and towards goals that we could never achieve alone. 
Humans have also succeeded in many large-scale projects which have involved 
extensive coordination: they have travelled to the moon, created the internet and 
mapped the human genome. The capacity for shared intentionality and coordination 
in humans exceeds that of other species (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005) to such an extent that humans have received the label of being a hypersocial 
and hypercooperative species (Richerson & Boyd, 2004). The central question is, 
what are the cognitive processes supporting this capacity? Which cognitive 
mechanisms facilitate the “being and acting together” often referred to as “We mode” 
(also called collective intentionality) (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1995; Tollefsen, 
2002)? Although no single cognitive skill could be named as an answer to these 
questions, joint attention—the ability to coordinate attention to an object or event of 
mutual interest— plays a crucial role (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Therefore, this 
thesis focusses on joint attention, without which we would not be the social, sharing 
and cooperating species we are now.  
Empirical research on joint attention started in the 1970s in the field of 
developmental psychology. Bruner and his colleagues published descriptions of 
infants’ ability to follow, direct, and share attention with their caregivers (e.g., 
Bruner, 1974; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Since then, a large body of research has 
demonstrated the importance of joint attention for social and communicative 
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development. Infants begin to actively share attention with others from around 9 to 
12 months of age: they engage in pointing, showing and gaze alternation about 
objects with their caregivers (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). It has been 
shown that joint attention scaffolds the learning of new words (Tomasello & Farrar, 
1986) and grammar (Rollins & Snow, 1998). Infants’ joint attention skills predict 
their later mental state language (Kristen, Sodian, Thoermer, & Perst, 2011), false-
belief understanding (Sodian & Kristen-Antonow, 2015) and social competence 
(VanHecke et al., 2007) at preschool age. The foundational role of joint attention 
skills in infants’ development is especially visible when these skills are lacking or 
impoverished, as in children with autism (Sigman, Mundy, Sherman, & Ungerer, 
1986).  
Over the years, interest in joint attention has branched out far beyond 
developmental psychology; joint attention has been studied in comparative 
psychology, social robotics, philosophy, and education sciences. Several recent 
studies have investigated joint attention in adults and focus on consequences of joint 
attention. It has been shown that when adult social partners simultaneously attend to 
the same object or event, their experience of the co-attended thing changes. For 
example, social partners pay more attention to the things in their environment when 
they believe that others attend to those things as well (Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 
2013; Shteynberg et al., 2014). Similarly, their experiences become intensified when 
they attend to the same thing with someone else (Boothby, Clark, & Bargh, 2014; 
Boothby, Smith, Clark, & Bargh, 2016, 2017). These effects are especially evident 
when social partners are psychologically close to each other (Boothby et al., 2016, 
2017; Shteynberg et al., 2014). Interestingly, another study has reported that joint 
attention affects social closeness: attending to the same object as opposed to a 
different object results in increased perceived closeness between adult participants 
(Wolf, Launay, & Dunbar, 2015). Thus, although more research is needed, these 
findings suggest that joint attention situations lead to increased cognitive processing 
and strengthen social bonding between social partners. 
Attending to the world around us jointly with others is rewarding, but it brings 
important advantages for us as well. In social interactions, joint attention not only 
allows us to coordinate our attention to things in the environment that can be 
directly perceived, but also focus together on mental states such as thoughts (Mundy, 
Sullivan, & Mastergeorge, 2009; O’Madagain & Tomasello, submitted). As a joint 
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focus enables us to coordinate our thoughts, behaviors and different roles when 
acting towards a common goal, it has been suggested that joint attention is crucial for 
our cooperation with others (Brinck & Gardenfors, 2003; Tollefsen, 2005; 
Tomasello, 1999). Surprisingly, however, few empirical studies have directly 
investigated the precise role of joint attention in facilitating successful coordination 
and cooperation.  
One reason is that although there is broad consensus about joint attention 
being one of the most important skills in social cognition, different scholars focus on 
different aspects of it, so there is still little agreement about what exactly joint 
attention is (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). In the next section I first briefly distinguish 
between two main approaches in studying joint attention: one which focuses on 
behaviors and another which focuses on the knowledge that social partners engaged 
in joint attention have. Then I turn to the question of how social partners achieve 
jointness in joint attention. This discussion will show that further empirical research 
would benefit greatly from an organized framework of different joint attention levels. 
1.1  The need for an organized framework 
Although it seems that almost every scholar who has been studying joint 
attention has his or her own unique way of defining it (see Part I for details), it is 
possible to categorize the approaches to joint attention broadly into two groups. 
Scholars in the first group have tended to focus on the behavioral aspects of 
coordinating attention (e.g., Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1989; 
Butterworth, 1995; Camaioni, 1993; Leavens & Racine, 2009; Mundy & Newell, 
2007). Scholars in the second group have highlighted what kind of knowledge 
partners have about each other when they engage in joint attention. They have 
argued that to be in joint attention, partners must know together that they are 
attending to the same thing, that is, they have to have common knowledge of their 
mutual attending (e.g., Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; Hobson, 2005; Tomasello, 1995). 
Following on from this, a related question is how partners reach this mutual 
understanding. Again, the answers vary greatly and involve a focus either on some 
type of recursive mind-reading (e.g., Bach & Hamish, 1979; Harder & Kock, 1976; 
Tomasello, 2008, 2011), intersubjective engagement (Gómez, 2005; Hobson, 2005; 
Eilan, submitted; Reddy, 2011), or intentional communication (Carpenter & Liebal, 
2011).  
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This lack of agreement is visible in the terminology used in this area too, as 
several other terms are used in the literature as synonyms for the term joint attention 
or describe phenomena that have significant overlap with joint attention, for example 
co-attention, shared attention, shared experiences, and joint engagement. This lack 
of agreement in both areas hinders progress in further understanding joint attention 
(Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). First, terminological confusion complicates dialogue 
among different disciplines. Second, different definitions lead to using different ways 
of measuring joint attention in experiments, which makes comparison of results 
across experiments difficult. For example, most developmental studies with infants 
operationalize joint attention in terms of initiating or responding to attention sharing 
communicative behaviors such as pointing, showing, and gaze alternation. In 
contrast, studies in social psychology tend to focus on situations in which adult 
participants co-attend to the same thing, and know they are co-attending, but do not 
engage in any communicative behaviors towards each other. For instance, a situation 
in which participants were simply looking at the same side of a computer screen 
while performing a reaction time task has been called joint attention (Wolf et al., 
2015).    
Here I will argue that joint attention is a different process when partners 
interact with each other (as in typical infant studies) and when partners co-attend 
without any interaction (as in typical adult studies). That is, recently, much attention 
has been given to the idea that our social-cognitive processes differ significantly 
when we observe others (adopting a third-person perspective) compared to when we 
are in direct engagement with others (adopting a second-person perspective) (e.g., 
DeJaegher, DiPaolo, & Gallagher, 2010; Heal, 2005; Reddy, 1996; Schilbach, 2010; 
Zahavi, 2008). In the same vein, several scholars have argued that a second-person 
relation and engagement are crucial for joint attention (Hobson, 2005; Gómez, 
2005; Eilan, submitted; Reddy, 2011). Overall, this body of work directly relates to 
the question of how social partners achieve jointness and common knowledge in 
joint attention. At this point in our understanding of this topic, it thus would be very 
useful to flesh out these ideas further in a way that integrates the question of what 
joint attention is with the question of how the common knowledge in it is achieved. 
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to take a new look at joint attention and 
common knowledge.  The first part of the thesis offers a new, organized framework of 
different joint attention levels with corresponding levels of knowledge states. The 
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framework emphasizes a distinction between a second-person, engaged perspective 
and a third-person, observational perspective and defines four joint attention levels 
(monitoring, common, mutual and shared attention).  
All of the different levels of joint attention are useful for interpreting and 
guiding our behavior in social contexts. Correctly identifying where others are 
focusing their attention in the environment facilitates an understanding of their 
attitudes, intentions, emotions, and beliefs. However, the proposed attention levels 
fulfil distinct functions and facilitate different kinds of social interactions.  For 
example, one level—shared attention—supports coordination much better than all 
the other levels for several reasons.  
First, as I will explain in more detail in Part I, in shared attention partners are 
engaged in a second-person relation to each other and actively share attention by 
intentionally communicating about the object of their attention. Communicative 
exchange allows social partners to coordinate their mental states about the object of 
attention. This leads to more effective coordination compared to a situation in which 
partners know that they attend to the same object, but have less information about 
their attitudes, goals, or intentions towards that object. Second, in shared attention 
partners generate a specific type of common knowledge: shared knowledge. This is 
relevant for successful coordination because shared knowledge increases partners’ 
certainty about their attention focus (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). Third, 
communicative exchange creates a public space in which commitments can come 
into existence (Gilbert, 2007). Commitments stabilize successful coordination 
between partners (Michael & Pacherie, 2015). Under certain circumstances, attention 
sharing can become normatively binding and give rise to commitments. To 
summarize, attention sharing supports coordination in several ways. It allows 
partners to align their mental states about the co-attended object and therefore 
create stronger expectations about their partner’s future behaviors. Attention sharing 
is also public, which allows partners to create commitments that facilitate successful 
coordination. Therefore, the rest of the introduction examines the role of attention 
sharing in coordination. 
1.2   Attention sharing as a coordination tool 
The goal of this section is to discuss how attention sharing facilitates 
successful coordination between partners. First, I focus on the context in which 
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attention sharing could have evolved. Then I briefly distinguish between two 
different types of coordination: fine-grained coordination of actions in time and 
space and strategic coordination. Next, I closely examine strategic coordination, 
explain the role of strategic coordination in coordination dilemmas, and highlight the 
importance of common knowledge as a crucial way of solving these dilemmas. 
Following that, I introduce coordination games as experimental methods for 
studying coordination dilemmas. There I discuss available experimental findings 
showing how adults and young children use attention sharing to solve the dilemmas. 
That section points to the need for further experimental studies investigating 
nonverbal ways of coordinating. Finally, in the last section I turn to attention sharing 
via communicative eye contact and argue that communicative eye contact is a 
powerful coordination tool, as it can create common knowledge and even possibly a 
commitment between social partners. 
1.2.1 The context for the evolution of attention sharing 
To understand the role of attention sharing in coordination, it is useful first to 
consider the environment in which the ability to share attention might have evolved. 
Humans are thought to have lived in small groups for a significant amount of time in 
their evolutionary history (Brewer, 2007). Although the exact time period and the 
specific reasons why attention sharing evolved are not known, the interdependence 
hypothesis argues that this skill probably evolved together with other social-cognitive 
and communicative skills supporting collaboration (Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, 
Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012). According to this theory, at some point in evolution, 
changes in the environment caused collaboration between social partners to become 
necessary for survival. It is argued that collaboration started in the context of 
collaborative foraging, when social partners had to coordinate with others to obtain 
food. Once collaboration was needed for survival, group members became 
interdependent, that is the success of one individual depended on the success of 
others. In other words, group members were interested in each other’s welfare since 
their partner’s welfare had direct beneficial consequences for them (Roberts, 2005). 
Following this line of argument, this type of mutualistic environment created a 
strong motivation to be a particularly helpful partner (Tomasello, 2014).  
This is the context in which the ability to share attention evolved. When 
humans started helping each other and working together more regularly, the ability 
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to share attention to relevant features of the environment became crucial, because it 
enabled them to reach their goals much more effectively. Successful coordination 
increased success in foraging activities, and therefore partners with superior skills in 
coordinating were preferred by others as future partners in collaboration. This 
pattern resulted in selective pressure for the evolution of cognitive skills that 
supported coordination, and attention sharing was one of them (Tomasello, 2008). 
Thus it is probably the case that the ability to share attention evolved within the 
context of mutualistic collaboration when social partners had to coordinate concrete 
actions with others in daily activities. It seems plausible that this ability initially 
evolved in interpersonal interactions within the context of dyadic or small groups in 
which partners shared attention to concrete, salient things in their environment (for 
example, to a predator or prey); and only later a more complex version of the skill 
evolved which enabled humans to share attention within larger groups and to 
abstract things or even mental states (O’Madagain & Tomasello, submitted).  
1.2.2 Two types of coordination 
There are at least two different angles from which to look at coordination.  The 
first angle focuses on coordination as action coordination between partners; the 
second on strategic coordination. Taking the first approach, several scholars have 
been asking how exactly social partners adjust their body movements to each other 
when they perform joint action, such as carrying a heavy object, dancing, or rowing a 
boat together. The main focus is on 1) studying low-level perceptual, cognitive and 
motor processes involved in temporal and spatial action coordination and 2) 
investigating how each of the partners forms representations of the other partner’s 
action goals, predicts the other partner’s action, and includes this information into 
their own actions (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009; Vesper et al., 2017; Vesper, Schmitz, 
Safra, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016). Although attention sharing is not directly 
investigated in this line of research, it is acknowledged as one of the mechanisms that 
supports action coordination. Specifically, attention sharing makes action 
coordination more efficient by creating a shared perceptual space between partners 
and allowing them to direct their attention to the same things in the environment 
(Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). This claim is supported by evidence from a 
study in which adult participants’ task was to assemble a Lego model together (Clark 
& Krych, 2004). During the task, one partner verbally instructed the other one about 
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how to build the model. When they both could see the building space, participants 
were twice as fast at completing the task compared to a situation in which they could 
not visually share the building space. Importantly, when they shared the perceptual 
space, they spontaneously used attention sharing behaviors such as pointing, 
showing blocks, nodding, and eye contact during the task, which helped them to 
coordinate.  
The second approach to coordination focuses on higher-level cognitive 
processes that take place before we engage in joint actions with others. Before we act, 
we consider relevant information for our actions. Often, we need to decide how to act 
based on our expectations of what others will do, and more than one solution exists. 
Taking this approach, scholars have been investigating strategic decision-making in 
“coordination dilemma” situations. 
1.2.3 Coordination dilemmas 
In coordination dilemmas (sometimes referred to as “coordination problems” 
or “social dilemmas”), two or more social partners have a shared interest, each 
partner’s outcome depends not only on his or her own decision but also on the 
decision of the other, and at least two solutions are possible (Lewis, 1969). To 
illustrate the nature of coordination dilemmas, consider the notable example by 
Chwe (Chwe, 2001). You and your companion are going to have a drink after work. 
You enter a bus to go to the pub, but the bus is crowded and you end up being 
separated from each other. At a bus stop which is before your agreed destination, a 
colleague of yours sees you and shouts from the sidewalk that both of you should join 
him there for a drink. You are interested in spending the evening with your 
companion, but joining another colleague would be an option as well, as long as you 
both go.  Before the bus starts going again, each of you has to make a decision about 
whether to get off the bus or not. You search for your companion but cannot see her 
because of the crowd. How do you decide? It is likely in this situation that you would 
wonder if your companion heard the offer to join the colleague. Suppose that you see 
her looking at your colleague just for a second, so you know that she heard the 
suggestion. But does she know that you heard it? Even if she does, does she know 
that you know that she knows that you know? It is not enough that each of you knows 
about the knowledge of the other separately. To successfully solve the dilemma, you 
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have to know together about the colleague’s invitation; in other words you need to 
have common knowledge about it (Clark, 1996; Chwe, 2001; Rubinstein, 1989). 
Coordination dilemmas can be modelled and studied under controlled 
conditions using economic games. Economic games are widely used in game theory 
and behavioral economics. The most commonly used game is the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a “conflict game”: the individual interests of 
each partner conflict with the mutual benefits. Each partner would be better off if the 
other one is worse off. In contrast to conflict games, coordination dilemmas are 
modelled as “coordination games” in which the partners have mutual interests and a 
common goal they want to reach. In the bus example given above, your and your 
companion’s shared goal is to spend the evening in each other’s company. Given the 
mutualistic context in which human coordination probably have evolved (Tomasello 
et al., 2012), as well as the structure of many social situations nowadays that humans 
often encounter, it has been argued that coordination dilemmas, and not conflict 
dilemmas, should be the main focus of scientific investigation (Skyrms, 2004). 
A prominent game used for studying coordination in mutualistic contexts is 
the Stag Hunt game (Rousseau, 1754; Skyrms, 2004). The structure of the game is 
illustrated by a hunting parable (Rousseau, 1754; Skyrms, 2004): Two hunters decide 
either to each hunt a hare (a certain but small prize) individually or to hunt a stag (a 
risky but big prize) together, if it is available. Hares appear in the forest often, stags 
in contrast appear only rarely. However, if just one partner decides to cooperate and 
hunt the stag and the other decides to hunt a hare (for instance, because he does not 
know the stag is available), the cooperating partner loses the chance to get anything, 
because she was wasting her effort in hunting the stag (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                   
1 The Prisoners Dilemma is illustrated by a story in which two suspects are questioned by the police 
separately. If one suspect claims that the other committed the crime, and the other remains silent, the 
first suspect goes free and the other is sentenced to a long term in prison. If both remain silent, they 
both get a short-term sentence. If both claim the other committed the crime, they both have to stay in 
prison for a moderate time (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). 
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Figure 1. Example of a Stag Hunt game pay-off structure. Number two represents a 
stag, number one represents a hare. 
 
 In a single-trial game, both partners must individually decide how to play and 
can make only one final decision. Both partners know that only when they both 
decide to cooperate, they get a high-value prize. There are two solutions in a Stag 
Hunt dilemma in which both get at least something: Either both partners decide to 
cooperate for a high-value prize (pay-off dominant solution, but risky) or each 
partner plays individually for a low-value prize (safe, risk dominant solution, but 
with a low-value prize). In contrast to the bus example above, in which coordinating 
getting off the bus vs. staying on it were equally valued, in the Stag Hunt game the 
two solutions are not equally valued. Coordinating on a collaborative option is better 
than coordinating on an individual option. However, the underlying structure is the 
same: Both partners get the most benefit when they coordinate their decisions. 
Again, the partners can solve this coordination dilemma if they have common 
knowledge, in this case, common knowledge that the collaborative option has 
become available (Clark, 1996; Chwe, 2001; Rubinstein, 1989).  
To test the prediction that common knowledge is needed for solving the Stag 
Hunt dilemma, in a recent study adult participants played a modified version of a 
Stag Hunt game (Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). Participants were 
allocated to one of four conditions and presented with written vignettes introducing 
the dilemma and the payoff structure of the game. Importantly, participants in each 
condition were given different information about the knowledge of their partner. 
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Before deciding between an individual or a collaborative option, all participants read 
that the collaborative option had become available. Participants in the first condition 
had no information about their partner’s knowledge. In the second condition, 
participants read that their partner knew about the collaborative option as well. In 
the third condition, participants learned that their partner not only knew about the 
collaborative option but also that they themselves knew about the collaborative 
option as well. Finally, in the last condition, participants were told that the 
information about the collaborative option was publicly announced via a loudspeaker 
(so everyone knew that everyone knew about it). The results showed that the 
majority of the participants in the last condition chose the risky collaborative option 
and their collaboration rates were significantly higher than those in the other 
conditions. This study thus demonstrated that publicly-broadcasted announcements 
are powerful cues for common knowledge and that participants recognized common 
knowledge as a distinct category, which in turn helped them to coordinate in 
deciding on a collaborative solution. Importantly, these results also provide clear 
evidence that adding a recursive step to one’s knowledge (i.e. you know that your 
partner knows that you know) does not equal the state of knowing it together.   
This study provided an important starting point for empirical investigations 
into the role of common knowledge in coordination. However, note that as 
participants were given written instructions, they were provided with the relevant 
information for making their decisions. Therefore, their decision-making was 
arguably less challenging than more natural situations in which we need to 
coordinate our decisions with others daily. Often, we need to extract the relevant 
information from the changing environment ourselves, consider how it affects our 
partner’s knowledge, and actively create common knowledge with our partners. So 
far, very few studies have addressed the question of how we produce, understand, 
and use common knowledge for strategic coordination during interpersonal 
interactions. As common knowledge is crucial part of attention sharing (e.g., 
Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; Tomasello, 1995), the next section discusses the available 
empirical evidence that both adults and children use attention sharing behaviors in 
strategic coordination. 
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1.2.4 Attention sharing in coordination dilemmas 
To establish attention to the relevant information in coordination dilemmas, 
for example to share attention to the fact that a collaborative option is now available, 
the obvious solution is to use verbal communication. With verbal communication 
speakers can precisely guide the other’s attention to specific things or events in the 
environment (Talmy, 2000) and by verbal exchange partners can create common 
knowledge between them. A study by Duguid and colleagues (Duguid, Wyman, 
Bullinger, Herfurth-Majstorovic, & Tomasello, 2014) demonstrated that verbal 
communication is a common strategy for solving coordination dilemmas even for 
preschoolers.  In their study, pairs of 4-year-old children played a modified version 
of a Stag Hunt game. As they could not see each other’s decisions due to a barrier 
between them, they were not sure whether their partner saw the collaborative option 
when it appeared. When children needed to decide whether to choose the risky 
collaborative option, they spontaneously shared attention to the fact that the 
collaborative option had become available by verbally communicating about it. 
Spontaneous use of verbal communication as a way to solve coordination dilemmas 
has been found with adult participants as well (Brosnan, Wilson, & Beran, 2012). 
Another effective way in which partners can share attention when 
coordinating is through the use of gestural communication. It has been shown that 
small groups of adults in a social foraging experiment spontaneously used pointing 
and waving to indicate to their partners where to put their collective foraging efforts 
(King et al., 2010). Although they used verbal communication as well, it was the use 
of gestures that best predicted how successful they were in discovering the most 
profitable foraging location. Overall, participants who were allowed to communicate 
were more successful in collecting resources than participants in a condition in which 
communication was discouraged. Although King and colleagues did not discuss 
common knowledge as a reason for their participants’ coordination success, it 
appears likely that that the common knowledge (about the most profitable location 
for foraging) that participants created by means of verbal and nonverbal 
communication resulted in an expectation that all members would put their efforts 
into that place.  This study thus points to the potential importance of nonverbal 
communication for coordination success and illustrates the fact that attention 
sharing behaviors support not only dyadic but also group coordination. 
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It is important to note that for verbal or gestural communication to be a 
successful coordination tool, it is necessary that the communication is a bi-
directional process: Both partners need to know that what one said or gestured the 
other understood (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Coming back to the bus example above, it 
would not be enough if in a crowded bus you shout, “Let’s get off at this bus stop” or 
point toward your colleague outside, as you would not know whether your partner 
could hear you or see your pointing gesture. Even 1-year-old infants know this and 
adapt their gestural communication according to their partner’s focus of attention 
(Liszkowski, Albrecht, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). What is needed is that both of 
you are mutually aware of your colleague outside. Although existing theoretical 
accounts do not agree on how exactly mutual understanding between two partners is 
reached, it has been proposed that eye contact  is an especially powerful nonverbal 
generator of common knowledge, as it provides instantaneous, direct, and 
bidirectional information about both partners’ focus of attention (Carpenter & 
Liebal, 2011; Chwe, 2001; Thomas et al., 2014). Although verbal exchange has the 
advantage that partners can create common knowledge even when they are separated 
in time and space, eye contact has the advantage over verbal communication 
(without eye contact) that partners do not need to check whether they are paying 
attention to each other. When the eyes of social partners meet, both know for certain 
where their attention is focused (Gómez, 1996).  We often use a combination of 
verbal communication, gestures and eye contact to create common knowledge. 
However, in situations requiring instantaneous decisions in which verbal 
communication is either not possible or too time consuming, we might rely on eye 
contact only.  
Eye contact is an intriguing behavior both from an evolutionary and a 
developmental perspective. Compared to most primates, the human eye region has 
subtle differences that make it highly salient. First, the sclera of the human eyeball is 
white; second, there is a contrast in color between human facial skin, the sclera, and 
the iris; third, human eyes are large in proportion to our body size; and fourth, 
humans eyebrows are salient (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 1997). It has been suggested 
that these features evolved as an adaptation to the increased need to coordinate with 
others using eye contact in collaborative interactions (Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann, & 
Call, 2007). From the developmental perspective, humans show great interest in the 
eye region basically from birth, with a special sensitivity to eye signals already 
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developing in early infancy (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002). Importantly, 
infants’ developing understanding of eye contact and gaze enables them—together 
with other nonverbal behaviors, such as pointing—to share attention and thus to gain 
basic competence in establishing common knowledge with their partners (Carpenter, 
2009).  
Much attention has already been given to eye contact as a coordination tool in 
face-to-face conversations: Eye contact is used to initiate and regulate the timing of 
interactions (Argyle, Ingham, Alkema, & McCallin, 1973), to attribute emotions and 
mental states to each other (Baron-Cohen & Cross, 1992; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
& Jolliffe, 1997), and to express intimacy (Argyle & Dean, 1965). Surprisingly, 
however, little is known about eye contact as a coordination tool in the context of 
strategic cooperation. To my knowledge, only one previous study has investigated 
this.  
Wyman, Rakoczy, and Tomasello, (2013) studied children’s ability to create 
common knowledge about the availability of the cooperative option using eye 
contact. In this study, 4-year-old children were discouraged from communicating 
verbally while playing a modified version of a Stag Hunt game with an experimenter. 
Crucially, when the collaborative option became available, before children had to 
choose whether to play individually or collaboratively, the experimenter made one of 
two different types of eye contact with children. In the control condition, when the 
collaborative option appeared, the experimenter monitored it visually—it was clear 
that she saw it—but did not look at children. Thus, in this condition, children 
themselves knew that the collaborative option was available and they also knew that 
their partner could see it as well, as she was looking directly at it. In the experimental 
condition, in contrast, the experimenter alternated gaze between the cooperative 
option and children’s eyes. During this communicative eye contact, she opened her 
eye widely, raised her eyebrows and smiled at children. Therefore, in this condition, 
children not only knew that both they themselves and the experimenter saw the 
collaborative option, but also knew that both they and the experimenter both knew 
that they both saw it. Results showed that more children decided for the collaborative 
option in the experimental than in the control condition. This suggests that the 
communicative eye contact and smile from the experimenter potentially led to 
common knowledge about the availability of the collaborative option between them, 
which in turn facilitated their coordination. Note that although this study used a 
24 
 
 
different version of the Stag Hunt game than Duguid and colleagues (Duguid et al., 
2014) and Thomas and colleagues (Thomas et al., 2014), all of these studies found 
evidence that when participants could gain some form of common knowledge, they 
overwhelmingly chose the collaborative option. The Wyman et al. (2013) study in 
addition provided evidence that eye contact can influence coordination decisions.  
However, due to the manipulation they used (i.e., communicative eye contact with a 
smile compared to no eye contact) it is unknown whether any type of eye contact can 
promote the common knowledge which makes coordination possible or whether the 
look needs to have specific characteristics, e.g., whether it needs to be an ostensive-
communicative look.  
It has been argued that to attend to and know something together with 
someone, it is necessary that partners share their attention through intentional 
communication (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). According to this proposal there is an 
important qualitative difference between non-communicative eye contact (which 
could be even accidental or a result of checking where the other is looking) and 
ostensive-communicative eye contact that enables active sharing of attention. The 
communicativeness of eye contact could be conveyed by substantial (e.g., raising 
eyebrows, opening eyes widely) or subtle (e.g., lowering eyelids) movements of 
muscles in the eye region as well as by the timing and contingency of the eye contact 
in relation to things and events happening in the environment. In communicative eye 
contact both the bi-directionality of contact and intentional communication work 
together in promoting mutual understanding between partners. Eye contact serves as 
a platform for fast and efficient flow of information; both partners become senders 
and receivers of information at the same time so bidirectional attention contact can 
be established (Gómez, 1996). However, the communicative part is no less 
important. Only communicative eye contact is ostensive (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), 
signals communicative intention (Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Gómez, 1996, 2010) and 
allows partners to start experiencing the object of their attention truly together 
(Hobson & Hobson, 2007). Thus, communicative eye contact could generate 
common knowledge between partners and allows them to coordinate their decisions.  
Interestingly, communicative eye contact might support successful 
coordination for a different reason as well: by creating a commitment to cooperate 
(Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). Bi-directional communication makes the content of the 
communication public (Gilbert, 2007; Taylor, 1985). A meta-analysis of conflict 
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games with adults demonstrated that when participants could communicate, 
successful coordination increased nearly 40% over baseline rates (Sally, 1995). 
Communication generally increases trust between social partners (Loomis, 1959), 
but it has been shown that the main reason why communication facilitates 
coordination in these contexts is that participants were exchanging promises to 
cooperate before the decision, and thus they created commitments (Bicchieri, 2006). 
Commitments serve the important function of reducing uncertainty in social 
interactions, for example, by generating specific expectations, by making existing 
expectations more salient, by activating reputation concerns and/or by making 
people’s behavior mutually salient (Michael & Pacherie, 2015). Therefore, 
commitments help to stabilize both partners’ behavior and coordination between 
them (Bratman, 1999).  
Although there is a considerable amount of interest in verbal commitments 
(e.g., promising), it has been proposed that under certain conditions commitments 
might arise nonverbally as well (for details, see Part II). Communicative eye contact 
is a good candidate for signaling nonverbal commitments, because it is bidirectional, 
public and can communicate one’s readiness to act in a certain way. For example, in 
Stag Hunt dilemma situations, both partners know that the appearance of the 
collaborative option is relevant. They also know together that if they have common 
knowledge about it, deciding for collaboration is in their mutual best interest. 
Because a partner who initiates communicative eye contact contingently upon the 
appearance of the collaborative option publicly signals that she knows about it (and 
therefore is prepared for collaboration), given the understanding that this is the best 
thing for both partners to do if possible, this behavior could be seen as a commitment 
to choose the collaborative option (Gilbert, 2007).  
To summarize, the goal of the empirical investigation in Part II of this thesis is 
to explore the role of two types of eye contact (non-communicative vs. 
communicative eye contact) in solving a coordination dilemma. The goal is to 
advance our understanding of non-verbal ways of strategic decision-making in 
interpersonal situations and to contribute to discussions about the important but 
difficult question of how social partners achieve mutual understanding. 
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1.3 Focus of the thesis 
This thesis has two parts: 1) A theoretical investigation into the distinct ways 
in which humans coordinate their attention and knowledge states with others, and 2) 
an empirical investigation into the role of sharing attention and communicative eye 
contact in particular in facilitating cooperative behavior.  
More specifically, the first aim of the thesis is to address the problem that 
despite over 40 years of work and hundreds of publications on the topic of joint 
attention, there is still surprisingly little agreement in the field about what exactly 
joint attention is, and how the attending and knowing together state in it is achieved. 
Part of the problem, I propose, is that joint attention is not a single process, but 
rather it includes a cluster of different cognitive skills and processes, and different 
researchers focus on different aspects of it. A similar problem applies to common 
knowledge. The theoretical part of the thesis thus presents a new approach: I outline 
a typology of attention levels (from monitoring to common, mutual, and shared 
attention), along with corresponding levels of common knowledge and then consider 
cognitive, behavioral, and phenomenological aspects of the different levels. A key 
distinction in all of this is second-personal vs. third-personal relations. It is useful to 
distinguish these levels because they fulfil different functions and have different 
consequences in terms of what kinds of interactions and obligations they support. 
While the focus is mainly on joint attention and common knowledge, I also briefly 
discuss how these levels might apply to other ‘joint’ mental states such as joint goals.   
The second aim of the thesis is to investigate closely the role of sharing 
attention in promoting coordination. Successful cooperation in the context of 
coordination dilemmas like the Stag Hunt game faces two main challenges. The first 
challenge is the uncertainty about one’s partner’s knowledge: “Does my partner know 
that the cooperative option is available?” It is not enough if each social partner knows 
individually that the cooperative option is available. Only if both partners know 
together (that is, if they have common knowledge) that the cooperative option is 
available can this challenge be overcome (Clark, 1996; Chwe, 2001; Rubinstein, 
1989). The second challenge is about the uncertainty about one’s partner’s behavior: 
“Even if my partner does know about the cooperative option, will she cooperate?” To 
overcome this challenge, partners might create commitments to cooperate, as 
commitments stabilize cooperative behavior (Michael & Pacherie, 2015). However, 
there is an ongoing debate about how commitments can come about. Some scholars 
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propose that only certain verbal statements or conventional acts (e.g., saying “I 
promise”) will create promissory obligations, whereas others claim that the core of 
commitments is not rooted in social conventions, but instead in more general moral 
principles.  
I hypothesized that communicative, but not non-communicative, eye contact 
can serve to create common knowledge about the availability of the cooperative 
option and thus promote expectations of cooperation between partners. I also 
hypothesized that communicative, but not non-communicative, eye contact might 
even be powerful enough to create a commitment between partners. This prediction 
was made because once shared attention is established, the fact that partners are 
paying attention to the same thing together is communicated, and therefore public, 
and, to some extent, undeniable. To test these hypotheses, I conducted two 
experimental studies with 5- to 7-year-old children. Although these hypotheses have 
not been tested in adults, testing young children enables to get at the origins of the 
ability to use attention sharing for coordination. In addition, testing young children 
provides an important methodological advantage, as studies can be designed as 
games, and allow to measure truly spontaneous behaviors. 
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2. Part I: A new look at joint attention and common knowledge 
From infancy through adulthood, joint attention is one of the most important 
skills in human social cognition. In joint attention we focus on things together with 
others (Mundy et al., 2009). Thus, joint attention allows us to share experiences 
about the world with others, to coordinate our thoughts and behaviors, and to 
cooperate successfully with others (Tomasello, 1999; Trevarthen, 1979). It provides a 
foundation for early language development and social competence and facilitates 
social learning (Mundy, 2003). Individuals who lack the skills to follow and share 
attention with others have significant difficulties in relating to other people and 
sustaining relationships (Mundy & Newell, 2007). 
Despite universal agreement about the importance of joint attention, however, 
there is still surprisingly little agreement on exactly what joint attention is and how it 
is achieved. Even now, more than 40 years after the first articles on joint attention 
were published (Bruner, 1974; Lewis, 1969; Scaife & Bruner, 1975), there is much 
variability in how different researchers define and use the term joint attention. For 
example, some focus mainly on behaviors and define joint attention simply as 
“looking where someone else is looking” (Butterworth, 1995, p. 29). Others go further 
and define it as “the intentional co-orientation of two or more organisms to the same 
locus” (Leavens & Racine, 2009, p. 241). Others bring in the idea of interest, defining 
joint attention as “the ability to coordinate attention toward a social partner and an 
object of mutual interest” (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984, p. 1278; see also Baron-
Cohen, 1989; Camaioni, 1993; Mundy & Newell, 2007). Still others go further, 
considering what kind of awareness the individuals must have and arguing that to be 
in joint attention, the individuals must know together that they are attending to the 
same thing: They must have common knowledge of this (e.g., Carpenter & Liebal, 
2011; R. P. Hobson, 2005; Tomasello, 1995). On the surface, these definitions may all 
sound similar – they all involve two individuals attending to the same thing – but 
actually, as we will see, there are important differences among them; differences 
which may account for many misunderstandings and unnecessary debates in the 
literature (Carpenter & Call, 2013).  
A related long-standing debate concerns how the jointness and common 
knowledge in joint attention (and joint action) are achieved. There are definitional 
and terminological issues here as well: Some authors use the term “common 
knowledge” (Lewis, 1969) and others use the term “mutual knowledge” (Pinker, 
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2007; Schiffer, 1972) to describe this phenomenon, whereas others reserve “mutual 
knowledge” for the state in which you know X and I know X, but nothing else 
(Vanderschraaf & Sillari, 2014). Still others use “common knowledge” and “mutual 
knowledge” interchangeably (e.g., Clark, 1992, 1996). Regardless of which term is 
used, there is little agreement about how we can know something together with 
someone else. Some authors have proposed that individuals infer common 
knowledge through a finite number of recursive steps (e.g., three to five, Bach & 
Hamish, 1979; Harder & Kock, 1976). In some of his writings, Tomasello (e.g., 2008, 
2011) takes a modified version of this approach, claiming that some type of recursive 
mind-reading is involved in joint attention, even in infants. However, others have 
pointed out that the processing demands for even just a few steps of recursive 
thinking are high, thus casting serious doubt on whether this can be how we – even 
as adults – achieve common knowledge instantaneously and effortlessly in most 
everyday circumstances (e.g., Clark & Marshall, 1981; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Clark 
(1992) has suggested that we represent common knowledge as a ‘single mental 
entity’, e.g., “You and I mutually know X”. Similarly, Pinker (2007) proposed that we 
employ a simplified recursive formula, such as Y: “You and I know X, and you and I 
know Y”, where Y is both the entire formula and part of it.   
More recently, there is growing momentum in the idea that there is a crucial 
difference between the social cognition process when we act as detached observers of 
others (adopting a third-person perspective) versus when we directly engage in 
interaction with them (adopting a second-person perspective). It has been claimed 
that the primary way of understanding others is not through observing but rather 
through interacting and experiencing with them; consequently, there are calls to 
increase scientific attention to second-person engagement (e.g., DeJaegher, DiPaolo, 
& Gallagher, 2010; Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Heal, 2005; Michael, 2011; Reddy & 
Morris, 2004; Reddy, 1996, 2018; Schilbach, 2010; Schilbach et al., 2013; Zahavi, 
2008, 2011). Regarding joint attention more specifically, it has been suggested that a 
second-person relation between individuals (Eilan, submitted; Gómez, 2005) and 
intersubjective engagement (R. P. Hobson, 2005; Reddy, 2011) are necessary 
conditions for joint attention. These ideas have direct implications for how the 
jointness and common knowledge in joint attention (and joint action) could be 
achieved.  
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Therefore, here we develop these ideas further by taking a new look at joint 
attention and common knowledge and systematically distinguishing several closely 
related but clearly distinct phenomena within them. We begin by outlining a typology 
of different social attention levels, which are currently all referred to in the literature 
as joint attention. We call them ‘social attention’ because all levels include 
consideration of another person’s attention; thus all levels depict some form of 
triadic relation between self, other, and an object of their attention. Within these 
levels, we propose corresponding distinctions for the social knowledge states that 
support these attention levels. We then introduce the idea that the social attention 
and knowledge levels exist on a ‘scale of jointness’ (i.e., in terms of how much the 
other is in mind, the certainty of jointness, and the felt connection with others), and 
describe several factors (e.g., goals, saliency, timing and contingency, behaviors) that 
can cause shifts in this scale. Next, we discuss the complexity of social attention and 
some of the different functions of these levels. Finally, we suggest directions for 
future studies: We briefly sketch how the levels map onto the available findings in 
human infants, animals, and social robots, and show how the typology can be applied 
to other joint mental states. 
2.1  A typology of social attention and social knowledge   
First, a few general notes. Although the literature on joint attention has 
primarily focused on the visual modality, note that each of these levels can apply to 
all types of external sensory inputs (visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory 
e.g., Bigelow, 2003); that is, not only can we look at something together, we can also, 
for example, listen to or smell something together. Moreover, objects of attention can 
be present, past, future, or imaginary events and states (including the lack of 
something); the self or the other (Reddy, 2003); and even mental states such as 
thoughts, beliefs, etc. (O’Madagain & Tomasello, submitted). In addition, joint 
attention can come about through both bottom-up processes (i.e., through 
automatic, reflexive shifts of attention to a salient stimulus) and top-down processes 
(i.e., in an active, goal-directed way; Brinck, 2004; Kaplan & Hafner, 2006). Finally, 
for the sake of simplicity, most of the time we talk about two individuals, but of 
course more individuals can engage in each level as well. We use examples involving 
humans, but our framework does not presuppose that only humans are able to 
engage in these levels (see below for more on this).  
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In what follows, we define four levels of social attention (monitoring, 
common, mutual, and shared). We categorize the levels according to the participants’ 
perspective (i.e., detached, third-person perspective vs. engaged second-person 
perspective), the type of knowledge they achieve from being in these attentional 
states (individual vs. common knowledge of different types), the participants’ 
dependency on each other (independence vs. interdependence), and the kind of 
experience the participants have (individual vs. co-created), and we discuss some of 
the behaviors involved in each level. Above we used the term common knowledge to 
refer generally to states that involve ‘knowing together’, as it is a well-established 
term. However, in what follows, we further distinguish common, mutual, and shared 
knowledge to refer to the specific knowledge states associated with the corresponding 
attention levels. We use the term knowledge in common as an overarching term to 
refer to different ways of knowing together in general. 
A necessary pre-condition for each of the four social attention levels is that 
one is able to engage in individual attention. Individual attention simply means 
attending to something while engaging with the environment from a first-person 
perspective only. The attender is completely independent of others (no others need 
even be around), she has individual knowledge about the object of attention, and 
there is no intention or motivation to follow into or change or connect with someone 
else’s attention state.  
2.1.1  Monitoring attention 
An individual is monitoring attention when she takes a third-person, 
observer’s perspective on a second individual, and attends to what the other is 
attending to. 
Example 1: On an airplane, Allison notices that Rob, who is sitting next to her, 
suddenly moves his head closer to the airplane window and looks out. Allison follows 
Rob’s gaze and sees another airplane passing by and, at the same time, knows that 
Rob sees the airplane as well. Example 2: Annie is attending an anti-government 
demonstration. Suddenly, the sound of a loud siren fills the area. To protect her 
hearing, Annie covers her ears with her hands. A stranger, Alvy, stands in front of 
Annie with his back turned to her. Annie sees that Alvy also covers his ears when the 
siren starts. Annie is paying attention to the siren and, at the same time, focuses on 
the fact that Alvy is paying attention to the siren as well. Annie has individual 
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knowledge about the siren and about the fact that Alvy perceives the siren as well. 
Her attention level is independent of that of Alvy in the sense that she can engage in 
this level separately, without Alvy’s active contribution or even awareness that she is 
there. Annie is having an individual experience. In this level, individuals do not have 
to be in the same level (as they do in the common, mutual, and shared levels below). 
Here, Annie is monitoring attention and Alvy is in individual attention. However, 
note that even when both individuals are monitoring each other’s attention 
simultaneously, each just assesses the attention and knowledge state of the other 
individually, so both their experience and their knowledge remain individual. Often, 
monitoring attention results in an observable change in the monitor’s behavior (e.g., 
turning one’s gaze, head, and/or body orientation to look at what the other is looking 
at), but it is also possible to monitor someone’s attention covertly, without producing 
any easily observable behaviors. 
One can go beyond monitoring another’s attention and additionally 
manipulate it. An individual is manipulating attention when she takes a third-
person, observer’s perspective on a second individual, monitors the other’s attention, 
and then acts in such a way as to get the other to attend to something else. Like 
monitoring attention, manipulating attention involves individual knowledge and 
experience and can be independent of the other in the sense that we can manipulate 
others’ attention without even being there (e.g., if we leave something out in a 
conspicuous place for them to see when they get home).  
One can intentionally manipulate another’s attention in several ways. First, 
one can increase the saliency of events such that they capture the other’s attention. 
For example, if a guest at a dinner party does not want to ask directly for more wine, 
she can surreptitiously move her empty glass into the host’s visual field so the host 
will likely notice it and refill it (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This requires monitoring 
what the host can/will be able to see. Second, one can directly manipulate someone 
else’s attention via a sort of unidirectional communication. The goal of unidirectional 
communication is only to convey information (e.g., there is something over there) 
from one individual to another, not to create a common focus of attention (in 
contrast to the bidirectional communication that takes place in the shared attention 
level below). Gestures such as pointing can be used to direct someone’s attention in 
this way. For instance, when the siren starts, Annie turns to Alvy, points ambiguously 
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to the side while shouting, “The police are coming, look!” Alvy searches for the police. 
Annie uses the moment of distraction to steal Alvy’s bag and run away.  
 
In contrast to the monitoring attention level, which involves individual 
knowledge and experience, some type of common knowledge about the focus of the 
individuals’ attention is an integral part of each of the next three (common, mutual, 
and shared) levels. That is, in each of the next levels, it is necessary that both 
individuals are in the same level in order to achieve these levels. 
2.1.2 Common attention 
Two individuals are in common attention when they each take a third-person, 
observer’s perspective on the other, more or less simultaneously attend to what the 
other is attending to, and infer not only that they are both attending to the same 
thing, but also that they are attending to each other’s attention to the thing.  
Individuals can engage in common attention when 1) the object of attention is 
salient or public (so they can assume that they are attending to the same thing) and 
2) the other’s attention is relevant for them (so they both have a reason to consider 
the other’s attention, for example they are in close physical proximity, or they have a 
previously-established joint goal, or they want to predict each other’s actions). Under 
these conditions, individuals could know that they are attending to each other’s 
attention without any contact or communication. 
Example 1: Suddenly, the lights go off in the plane and Allison and Rob find 
themselves in darkness. Allison is attending to the fact that it is dark, to the fact that 
Rob must also be perceiving the darkness, and to the fact that each knows that they 
each know this, and Rob is engaging in the same attentional processes. Example 2: 
Alvy stands next to Annie, so they are aware of each other’s presence. Annie is 
attending to the siren, to the fact that Alvy is attending to the siren, and to the fact 
that each knows that they each know this since the siren is so loud that it is clear that 
everyone in the vicinity must be hearing it. Alvy is engaging in the same attentional 
processes. Annie and Alvy have common knowledge about the siren achieved via 
recursive assumptions, inferences, and perspective-taking, since there are no specific 
external behaviors (beyond monitoring attention) associated with this level. Their 
attention level is dependent on that of the other in the sense that, from a bird’s-eye 
perspective, both of them must engage in these attentional processes in order to 
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achieve this level. From each individual’s perspective, however, each evaluates 
separately whether they are in common attention and each might be mistaken about 
it (e.g., one believes that they are in common attention but later finds out that they 
were not). Therefore, Annie’s and Alvy’s experience, when reasoning about each 
other’s attention, is individual.  
2.1.3 The question of jointness 
This last point is key in separating the common attention level from the next 
two (mutual and shared) levels. According to one of the richest definitions of joint 
attention, individuals must know together that they are attending to the same thing 
(Tomasello, 1995). It might seem that already in common attention Annie and Alvy 
are attending together to the loud siren, because they have common knowledge about 
it. However, we would argue that they are not truly attending with each other yet, as 
they have not yet made ‘attention contact’ with each other (Gómez, 1996), actively 
shared the information in any way yet (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011), or in Taylor's 
(1985) terms, they have not yet put it out there ‘between us’ as something to focus on 
together. Because in the common attention example Annie stands in a third-person 
relation to Alvy at this moment, she must represent and assess Alvy’s knowledge 
recursively (he knows that I know that he knows…). With this classic recursive 
approach (or some simpler version of it; Clark, 1992; Pinker, 2007), they can each 
know that they each know about the siren and each other’s knowledge of both it and 
their own knowledge, and thus can achieve a type of common knowledge. However, 
this level of attention and knowledge does not seem to be known truly together in any 
meaningful way. In contrast to the ‘meeting of minds’ that takes place in the classic 
‘joint attentional triangle’, it is basically two individual perspectives that never meet 
in the middle: Each individual just assesses the attention and knowledge states of the 
other individually (Calabi, 2008; Carpenter & Liebal, 2011).  
In third-person relations, fairly complex processes including recursive 
assumptions, inferences, and perspective-taking are used to achieve common 
knowledge. However, in second-person relations, engagement can allow for a 
different, more direct and non-inferential processing of the situation, which is not 
possible outside of this type of relation (Gómez, 2005; Reddy, 1996). Thus the 
proposal is that we should reserve the terms ‘mutual’ and ‘shared’ for interactions 
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that involve this second-personal relation – where it is really done together (Eilan, 
submitted; Gómez, 2005; Reddy, 1996, 2011; Zahavi, 2015).  
In a second-person relation, one no longer has a detached, observer’s attitude 
toward the other and his or her attention; the other is not perceived as ‘he’ or ‘she’ 
(Reddy & Morris, 2004). Instead, both individuals are in direct engagement with 
each other and treating each other as ‘you’, and both are senders and receivers of 
information at the same time (Argyle & Cook, 1976; Zahavi, 2015). Direct social 
interactions provide both partners with a wealth of cues about what is relevant and 
salient, and where each other’s attention is focused, so there is no need to represent 
the recursive structure of the situation. Importantly, each partner becomes a 
“constituent part” of the other’s experience (Campbell, 2005; Zahavi, 2015). That is, 
their perspectives and attention to the object of attention are colored by their mutual 
awareness of each other’s attention, and the experience differs qualitatively from the 
situation in which the individuals attend to the same thing but are not relating as 
‘you’ to each other (as in the monitoring and common attention levels above).  
Although second-person engagement is typically described as being an 
extremely rich and in-depth intersubjective experience, actually it comes in degrees. 
Even within an interactional context, we can take different approaches towards the 
other (i.e., instrumental, detached, and objectified vs. engaged, involved, and 
attuned) – not all interactions involve mutual engagement (e.g., Buber, 1958; Fuchs, 
2013, Reddy, 2018; Schilbach, 2013). We will thus use the term second-person 
relation to refer to situations in which individuals adopt an engaged approach 
towards each other in an interactional context. Both the intensity of interactive 
exchanges and participants’ approach influence the richness of a second-person 
relation. A prolonged, face-to-face conversation between two close friends represents 
a rich version of this, but even a brief encounter between two strangers making eye 
contact can establish a second-person relation, although a very minimal one, as it 
already allows for bidirectional contact and signals openness for engagement (in 
contrast we skillfully avoid eye contact when no engagement is desired.)  
This is the crucial difference that we would like to highlight as we think about 
the difference between the previous levels and the next two: The previous levels have 
a unidirectional and individualistic nature; the next levels, mutual and shared 
attention, are bidirectional and relational. The main difference between the next two 
36 
 
 
levels lies in the presence or absence of intentional bidirectional communicative 
exchange about the object of attention.   
2.1.4 Mutual attention 
Two individuals are in mutual attention when they are engaged in a second-
person relation to each other, while they are more or less simultaneously attending to 
the same thing, such that both of them experience each other attending both to that 
thing and to their own attention to the thing and each other. Thus, mutual attention 
involves both individuals being aware (in a second-person relation to each other, but 
without intentional communication) that they are attending to the same thing with 
each other. Most prototypically, the individuals make eye contact about the thing. 
When their eyes meet, both know that they are attending to each other and ‘attention 
contact’ is established (Gómez, 1996). When the thing in the environment is salient 
and/or relevant for both individuals, eye contact enables them to gain reciprocal and 
reactive information about their attention to it. Another example of such 
bidirectional behavior is mutual touch (Botero, 2016) (e.g., squeezing hands). 
Example 1: When the lights go off in the plane, Allison and Rob grasp each 
other’s hand reflexively. Example 2: When the siren first starts, Annie looks around 
to see what is happening. So does Alvy, and their eyes meet. As their eyes meet, it is 
mutually manifested that they are both attending to the siren and that they both 
know that they both know this. Annie and Alvy have mutual knowledge about the 
siren achieved via experiencing it with each other. Their attention level is dependent 
on that of the other in the sense that both of them must engage in these attentional 
processes together in order to achieve this level. Their experience is qualitatively 
different from the individual experiences in the previous levels; they co-create their 
experience and it is colored by their direct mutual awareness of each other’s 
attention. Even though the eye contact signals to both individuals that the contact 
was established, in mutual attention neither of the individuals intentionally 
communicates about the object of their attention. 
2.1.5 Shared attention 
Two individuals are in shared attention when on top of an interaction that 
meets the criteria for mutual attention, in addition they intentionally communicate 
with each other about the object of their attention. In contrast to mutual attention, 
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which apparently typically comes about incidentally (e.g., via incidental eye contact), 
the state of shared attention is achieved intentionally and can often be an end in itself 
(Gómez, Sarriá, & Tamarit, 1993). 
Example 1: Rob sees the other airplane passing by in the distance. He points 
out the window for his son sitting next to him, waits until his son looks out at the 
airplane, and then they engage in eye contact and start talking about the plane. 
Example 2: When the siren sounds, as Annie starts looking around to see what is 
happening, so does Alvy, and their eyes meet. As their eyes meet, Annie raises her 
eyebrows questioningly, and Alvy responds with a concerned look. From the 
communication inherent in shared attention, Annie and Alvy gain several layers of 
shared knowledge about the siren (see below). Annie and Alvy’s attention level is 
dependent on that of each other in the sense that both must engage in these 
attentional processes in order to achieve this level. Again, they co-create their 
experience, but the experience is different from mutual attention as the 
communicative exchange allows them to actively align psychological states such as 
attitudes, emotions, and goals about the object of attention with each other.  
In the shared attention level, individuals follow and direct others’ attention, 
but in contrast to the corresponding but third-person monitoring and manipulating 
attention above, the goal here is to create a bidirectionally-shared focus of attention 
(Gilbert, 2007). Often, in the top-down case, one partner intentionally directs 
another’s attention to something they can focus on together, using behaviors that are 
intentionally communicative, checks that the other has perceived it, and the other 
partner confirms, communicatively, that attention is shared. Shared attention is thus 
characterized by behaviors in which individuals confirm to each other that they are 
attending to the same thing. The communication need not be verbal (although often 
it is, e.g., “Look!”); it could also, or in addition, simply involve ‘communicative’ or 
‘sharing’ looks (e.g., Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; J. A. Hobson & Hobson, 2007), that is, 
looks that express some message. Other prototypical examples of nonverbal 
behaviors are declarative gestures such as pointing and showing. This confirmation is 
present in the bottom-up case as well. When a stimulus is salient, partners first 
automatically shift their attention to it, and then they confirm verbally (e.g., “That 
was loud!”) or nonverbally (e.g., eye contact with nodding or smiling) that they are 
sharing attention (Brinck, 2004; Kaplan & Hafner, 2006). 
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Several layers of messages can be communicated in shared attention, which 
add to the layers of shared knowledge that can be gained. Not only do the partners 
have shared knowledge about the object of attention (the main referent or topic of 
their communication, e.g., we hear the siren), they also have shared knowledge about 
the communication itself (e.g., we intentionally communicated about our attention to 
the siren). In addition, partners also typically convey an attitude or comment about 
the object of attention (Bruner, 1975; Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; e.g., we are 
concerned about the situation), so they have shared knowledge about this as well. 
Sometimes they may even comment on the fact that attention is shared, or “share the 
experience of sharing” (R. P. Hobson & Hobson, 2008, p. 79), for example when an 
infant and her mother look at each other with a smile while playing, for no other 
reason than to express pleasure about their shared activity. The communication 
inherent in this level means that all of these things are out in the open, public, and, to 
some extent, undeniable (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). All of these layers create more 
specific shared common ground about the object of attention, the partners’ attitudes 
about it, and their shared experience, and contribute to building up the partners’ 
conversational record (Lewis, 1969).   
 
To summarize, here we have offered a new typology of different social 
attention and corresponding social knowledge levels, highlighting the difference 
between third-person and second-person relations. We suggest that we are not 
jointly attending to something with someone until we enter into a direct, reciprocal, 
and engaged second-person relation. The most prototypical case of this is the shared 
attention level; the minimal version is the mutual attention level. The levels have a 
cumulative structure in terms of the layers of knowledge involved. Using the siren 
example above:  
i) In all four social levels, I know that I hear the siren and that you hear the 
siren. 
ii) In the common, mutual, and shared levels, additionally, I know that each 
of us knows that each of us hears the siren and that we each know that we 
each know this about each other. 
iii) In the mutual and shared levels, additionally, I know that we are both 
experiencing together our hearing the siren and both know this.  
iv) In the shared level, additionally, we both know that we communicated to 
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each other about the siren and thus that we have confirmed to each other 
that we hear the siren together. 
See Figure 2 for a schematic depiction of each level, and Table 1 for a 
summary of some of the characteristics of each level. 
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Figure 2. The figure is from the perspective of target individual A. X is the object of 
attention. Arrows represent what A is attending to. The solid two-way arrow 
represents non-communicative eye contact, and the special two-way arrow 
represents communicative eye contact (and/or other bidirectional communication). 
Thought bubbles represent what A has in mind (this figure depicts a visual example).  
Individual attention 
Monitoring attention 
Common attention 
Mutual attention 
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B 
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X, B (he or she) 
B (he or she) sees X 
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We (you and I) see X 
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sharing seeing X 
B (he or she) sees X and 
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Table 1.   
Characteristics of the different attention levels. The same characteristic across levels is marked by the same color.  
 Individual Monitoring Common Mutual Shared 
Type of perspective First person Third person Third person Second person Second person 
Description of the 
experience 
I attend to X 
He or she 
attends to X 
He or she attends to 
X and knows I do 
too 
We (you and I) 
attend to X 
We (you and I)  
attend to X and 
are actively 
sharing this 
Type of interaction 
Dyadic (i.e., 
subject and 
object) 
Triadic Triadic Triadic Triadic 
Knowledge gained 
Individual 
knowledge 
Individual 
knowledge 
Common 
knowledge 
Mutual knowledge 
Shared 
knowledge 
Does the second 
individual know that the 
first is in that level of 
attention? 
Not necessarily Not necessarily Yes Yes Yes 
“Intimate I+you we 
feeling”2 
No No No Yes Yes, stronger 
Commitments and 
obligations 
No No 
Yes (but plausible 
deniability is 
possible) 
Yes (but some 
plausible 
deniability is still 
possible) 
Yes  
                                                   
2 There are several types of “we feeling” (Zahavi, 2015). Here we distinguish a) the intimate/private/personal we feeling arising from a bidirectional, direct 
connection with others (this we feeling is subjectively strong) and b) the associative we feeling arising from association with others, arising because 
individuals have something in common (e.g., they both are attending to the same thing; this feeling comes from knowing rather than experiencing). It is 
interesting to note here that while in mutual and shared attention, almost by definition you know exactly who you are attending with, in common attention 
this does not need to be the case.  For example, I can know that everyone (with normal hearing) within a certain radius must have heard the noise of a loud 
explosion, without knowing exactly who those people are. 
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2.2 A scale of jointness  
The social attention levels exist on a scale of jointness, with monitoring 
attention (in which we have an individual experience of the other’s attention) 
on the left side, representing no jointness, and shared attention (in which we 
truly attend to something together with the other) on the right side, 
representing the highest degree of jointness (see Figure 3). Aspects of jointness 
include (but are not limited to) the perceived psychological closeness between 
the individuals, how much the other is in mind, the connection felt (the ‘we 
feeling’; Zahavi, 2015), and the certainty about the object of attention and/or 
that attention is joint (see below for more on this latter point). For the sake of 
simplicity we provided prototypical examples for each level above, but it is 
important to note that in reality there exist stronger and weaker examples in 
each level, that is, that there is a continuum within each level too. Consider the 
siren example in the mutual attention level. This situation could range from 
accidental eye contact (while Annie and Alvy are instinctively looking around), 
to more intentional eye contact (e.g., Annie and Alvy each look at each other to 
check if the other hears the siren too, and they happen to do this at the same 
time), to eye contact with mutual reactiveness (during the eye contact Annie 
and Alvy both reflexively cover their ears). These examples lie to the left, 
middle, and right side of the scale in the mutual attention level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A scale of jointness.  
Monitoring attention Mutual attention Shared attention Common attention 
Third-person perspective 
(individually attending to the same thing) 
Second-person relation 
(jointly attending to the same thing) 
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2.2.1 Factors that can cause shifts in the scale of jointness  
There are a variety of factors that can make it more likely that we move 
along the scale, both along the different levels of the scale and within each level: 
 Saliency: Salient stimuli generally push situations to the right on the 
“jointness scale.” It is easier for individuals to establish all of these types of 
attention to very salient things (e.g., an elephant standing in the lobby of 
one’s office building) then to subtle things (e.g., a new vase standing in the 
lobby). However if a stimulus is too salient and attention-grabbing, we 
might focus solely on it and be stuck in individual attention (e.g., when a 
bomb explodes, we might at least initially just focus on ourselves and our 
own safety before thinking of anyone else). 
 Goals: The existence and strength of a relevant shared goal between the 
individuals, and their interest in it, pushes situations to the right on the 
“jointness scale.” If Annie and Alvy had recently spent long hours planning 
how to avoid being arrested at the anti-government demonstration, when 
the noise of the siren fills the area it is probable that they will be more on 
the right side of the scale compared to a situation in which they had not had 
a shared goal. 
 Type of common ground3: Similarly, the strength and depth of the 
common ground the individuals have can push the situation to the right of 
the scale. Increasingly joint types of common ground generally range from 
no common ground, to common ground for rational beings, to cultural 
common ground, to common ground from co-presence, to personally-
shared common ground (Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981). Example: 
Robin and Max are waiting at a bus stop and suddenly a bomb explodes in 
front of them. Contrast the situation in which Max is the 2-year-old son of 
the woman standing next to Robin and the situation in which Max is an 
adult colleague who had just recently discussed with Robin a newspaper 
article saying that there is a security threat in their country (so, in addition 
                                                   
3 Common ground suffers from terminological and conceptual confusion as well. In this paper 
we will use “common ground” as an umbrella term encompassing common knowledge, beliefs, 
and assumptions coming from different sources (e.g., co-presence, joint personal experiences, 
cultural background, etc.; Clark, 1996). 
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to all the other types, they have personally-shared common ground). In the 
first case, after looking communicatively to each other, because they share 
little contextually-relevant common ground, Robin and Max are on the left 
side of the scale in shared attention about the fact that the bomb exploded. 
In contrast, in the second case, they have quite specific shared common 
ground that is relevant to the explosion, so they are on the right side of the 
shared attention continuum. On top of their shared attention about the 
bomb exploding, they are sharing a more complex and detailed message 
such as, “Oh, no, it is here! We talked about this yesterday.” Note that if we 
have very specific shared common ground (especially recently shared 
common ground) we can communicate much more complex messages with 
less obvious behaviors. For example, if two employees have just been 
complaining about their boss, the briefest, most neutral and surreptitious 
glance between them during a meeting with her can convey a complex 
message (e.g., “See what I mean?”), especially if the look occurs 
contingently to something relevant that their boss just said.  
 Contingency and timing: As suggested above, strong contingency 
and/or a short time interval can push situations to the right on the scale 
(e.g., in the shared level, contingency and a short time interval between the 
appearance of the object of attention and the eye contact/communication, 
or between the formation or most recent discussion of the shared goal or 
common ground and the appearance of the object of attention). For 
example, in the siren example, consider the difference between cases in 
which Annie looks communicatively at Alvy immediately after the siren 
starts, 10 seconds later, or 10 minutes later. An immediate look would 
create a stronger feeling of jointness (lying more on the right side of the 
shared attention level) than a delayed look, and if they looked at each other 
10 minutes later, it might not be clear what the other’s look was about. 
 Perceptual space: Perceptual space with clear borders (an office, a 
department’s mailing list) or small perceptual spaces (a car) push situations 
to the right on the scale (especially with regard to the certainty that we are 
attending to the same thing with someone) compared to perceptual spaces 
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with vague borders (a university, Facebook) or huge perceptual spaces (a 
city, a concert hall).4 
 Behaviors: Observable behavior, ranging from unintentional or reflexive 
behaviors to verbal or otherwise explicit communication, pushes situations 
to the right on the scale. For example, when someone sneezes, it might send 
a signal to others that he can smell the pepper spilled on the table, or when 
someone gasps or sighs while watching a movie, it might send a signal to 
others that he was attending to something in the movie. And of course in 
the shared attention level, sharedness becomes more clear depending on 
the explicitness and ostensiveness of the communication. To illustrate, 
consider the example with the siren. As Annie’s and Alvy’s eyes meet, if they 
look silently at each other with communicative looks after the siren filled 
the area they would be more to the left of the continuum in the shared 
attention level than if Annie looked to Alvy and said, “Oh, this is bad!” and 
Alvy agreed.  
 Individual differences: People who tend to have others in mind more 
often or who have a higher motivation to share appear on the right side of 
the scale more often. One reason for this is simply because they initiate 
shared attention more often. 
 Relationship closeness: People who are close to each other end up on 
the right side of the scale more often. There is a natural tendency to have 
close others in mind and share attention more with people who are close 
(family members, friends, partners). 
2.2.2 Certainty  
Two kinds of certainty are important when attending socially with 
someone: 1) certainty about the object of attention – how can we know with 
  
                                                   
4 There is an interplay between the type of perceptual space and the type and saliency of the 
stimulus. For example, it is difficult to guess where the borders are for being able to perceive 
sound from an explosion, but it is easy to guess that the smell from freshly made cookies in a 
room will not reach the space outside the room when the door and windows are closed. 
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certainty that we are attending to the same thing as someone else? and 2) 
certainty that attention is joint – how can we know with certainty that we are 
attending to the same thing with someone else? Several ways of gathering 
information about other people’s attentional focus exist in different situations 
and influence our certainty. Some require fewer assumptions than others, for 
example you can see your friend seeing X (gaze following), but you can also just 
hear (but not see) that your friend is co-present, or just assume that your friend 
is co-present, and therefore you can assume that your friend perceives X. 
Similarly, fewer assumptions are required when we can directly perceive X in 
the environment (e.g., we can see/smell/hear X) (perceptual attention) than 
when we must infer the relevant object of attention (conceptual attention, e.g., 
to absent referents, for instance, an infant pointing about a missing puzzle piece 
for her mother).  
When the stimulus is very salient, the certainty that you are attending to 
the same thing as someone else does not necessarily change with the different 
social attention levels. We are sensitive to perceptual co-presence with other 
people, and expect similar perceptual or attentional abilities from them, unless 
we learn otherwise (e.g., we find out that someone is visually- or hearing-
impaired; Clark, 1996). Therefore, when a loud siren fills the area and you can 
hear it, you know that everyone else in the vicinity must be hearing it too.  
In contrast, being in the higher attention levels increases the certainty 
that we are attending to the same thing with someone. For example, imagine 
that you are sitting next to your friend in a train, and you see that, as soon as 
the woman sitting opposite you leaves for a moment, the man sitting next to her 
reaches into her purse and steals her wallet. Even before you and your friend 
engage in any behavior toward each other, you infer that the stealing is salient 
enough to grab the attention of your friend as well, and that your friend realizes 
the same about you, so you have common knowledge about the thief (common 
attention). However, your certainty that you are attending to this together 
increases considerably once you engage in eye contact after seeing it (mutual 
attention), and even more once you exchange concerned looks and/or point 
(shared attention).  
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Note that it is often impossible to be 100% certain that you are attending 
to the same thing with someone. Certainty is probabilistic and instead of 
“knowing” that you attend to the same thing, it is more precise to say that you 
“believe” this. That is, you each believe that you are attending to the same thing 
together, and that the other believes this with some probability too. How high 
the probability needs to be depends on the current purposes. So although we 
use terms like ‘knowing together’ and common, mutual, and shared knowledge, 
more specifically we mean belief with sufficiently high probability for those 
purposes (Clark, 1996; Monderer & Samet, 1989). To illustrate: If you consider 
confronting the thief together with your friend, certainty is important and thus 
you likely would not want to rely on common attention, but instead would 
engage in shared attention. 
2.3 The complexity of social attention 
Joint attention is often discussed in the literature as a discrete, 
momentary occurrence, in which individuals attend to a single object or event. 
However, many everyday social attention episodes are much more complex. 
First, most of the levels (i.e., all except mutual attention) can be quite extended 
in time. For example, a spy could monitor the attention of someone all day, and 
we can be in common or shared attention with other audience members at a 
concert or movie for hours.  
Second, in any given situation, we can move from individual attention to 
any other level, or move among the different social levels, instantaneously. 
Sometimes one level might function as a precursor to another level (e.g., when 
you want to show a hot air balloon to your partner, you might first monitor your 
partner’s attention, to determine where your partner’s focus is, and then choose 
the best way to initiate attention sharing). Sometimes we can even engage in 
two or more levels simultaneously (e.g., if you and I are monitoring the 
attention of someone else together, or when I take a third-person perspective 
on you during a second-person interaction, thinking, “Why is she looking at me 
that way?”; Reddy, 2018). This can result in a number of hierarchically-
embedded states of attention occurring at the same time, either with the same 
or different people. At a movie, for instance, I can simultaneously monitor the 
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attention of a character on the screen, be in common attention with other 
audience members that the character is looking at something, and turn to share 
attention to the thing the character is looking at with my partner. Similarly, the 
whole ‘going to the movie’ experience is a shared attention episode with my 
partner, and there are numerous hierarchically-embedded, smaller shared or 
mutual attention episodes within that experience, when we, for example, agree 
that the popcorn is very salty, or squeeze each other’s hands reflexively at a 
scary moment, etc. Thus, although we mainly discuss the different social 
attention levels separately in order to highlight the important differences across 
them, we note that complex relations can also exist among and within them. 
Third, the attention levels take place live, in real time. When we 
exchange letters with someone, although this is reciprocal communication, it is 
not shared attention (though real-time, immediate texting, in contrast, may be). 
However, we do create shared knowledge and common ground from these types 
of exchanges. We can also engage in virtual sharing in which we just imagine 
sharing attention with someone, for example, when I celebrate my country’s 
team’s goal while watching the World Cup abroad and imagine my dad cheering 
‘with’ me in our home country. Still, direct, real-time experience of social 
attention has unique qualities that cannot be fully attained with experiences 
that are sequential or delayed in time or space.  
2.4 Functions of the different levels 
It is useful to distinguish these levels for several reasons. First, as 
mentioned above, it should help in eliminating unnecessary confusion and 
debate in discussions about whether, for example, different animals can engage 
in joint attention (see below for our take on this). In addition, as we will discuss 
here, the different social attention levels serve different functions.  
Monitoring attention brings some advantages to individuals who are 
capable of it, over and above individual attention. First, it can be useful simply 
for gathering more information from the environment than one could on one’s 
own, for instance when as a result of monitoring someone else’s attention we 
discover something interesting or useful or dangerous that we might not have 
discovered on our own (e.g., Max is walking on a pier at a lake and he sees a 
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couple in front of him excitedly peering into the water. He approaches to find 
out what they are looking at and sees an alligator swimming there). Second, 
monitoring attention is useful in making informed predictions about others’ 
future actions, so we can adjust our own actions accordingly. This is often 
useful in competitive situations, because then the information gathered can be 
used exploitatively to gain an advantage over others (Tomasello, 2008). But we 
can also monitor others’ attention in prosocial situations (e.g., Pam is in a store 
and sees an elderly woman looking up, fixating her gaze frustratedly on 
something on a high shelf. Pam determines that the woman is looking at a box 
of tea, and so approaches and gets the box for the woman). Similarly, we can 
manipulate the attention of others to things in the environment either to reach 
our own goals (e.g., to get an object through others’ help by making them attend 
to something we need, for example, our wineglass that needs refilling; or by 
distracting their attention deceptively) or to help others to reach their goals 
(e.g., by redirecting their attention to something relevant for them).    
Common attention similarly helps us make informed predictions about 
others’ future actions. However in common attention one can understand not 
only what someone else attends to/knows but also what the other attends 
to/knows about one’s own attention/knowledge, and this allows for a 
considerably more complex appraisal of the situation. This can be especially 
helpful in solving ‘coordination dilemmas’ – situations in which it is in our 
interest to decide what to do based on our expectation of how our social partner 
is likely to behave, and our partner’s decision likewise depends on what he or 
she expects from us (Clark, 1996; Chwe, 2001). For example, imagine that a 
group of protesters has agreed before going to a demonstration that, no matter 
where they are in the crowd, whenever they hear a siren, they will start shouting 
anti-police slogans. Although all the protesters want to participate as a group, 
no one wants to engage in this potentially dangerous act alone. When a siren 
sounds, the protesters’ ability to engage in common attention with their fellow 
protesters to the sound of the siren may give them confidence to make the risky 
decision to start shouting. Being able to engage in common attention enables us 
to coordinate even in cases in which we are apart and contact or 
communication is not possible. However, in the common attention level we can 
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only coordinate attention towards salient or relevant things or events in the 
environment. If it is not clear that everyone can hear the siren, it would be more 
difficult or even impossible to engage in common attention with any certainty. 
In contrast to the individualistic nature of these two levels, in which we 
must examine the situation and consider our partner’s attentional state from 
the perspective of an outside observer, the direct nature of the attention contact 
in the mutual and especially shared attention levels, as well as the bidirectional, 
reciprocal evidence it provides about where each partner’s attention is focused, 
makes communication, interaction, coordination, and collaboration much more 
efficient and fluent.  
The reciprocal evidence of each other’s attention that attention contact 
provides has further implications as well. Even the minimal attention contact 
present in the mutual attention level can create some feeling of obligation. For 
example, imagine that Jane slips on the wet floor and is having difficulty 
standing up again. As she looks around embarrassedly to see if anyone is seeing 
this, she accidentally makes eye contact with a man who was watching nearby. 
They end up in mutual attention about Jane’s fall and her attempts to stand up, 
as this is a salient event. In this case, it would be difficult for the man to deny 
having seen Jane fall, because the same single event of making eye contact 
when seeing Jane’s fall also removed any doubt in the man’s mind that she saw 
him seeing her fall. Consequently, mutual attention can create some pressure to 
follow social norms in situations in which people need to decide whether to act 
in accordance with norms or not. That is, the man might feel more strongly that 
he should help Jane stand up when they have mutual knowledge about Jane’s 
fall compared to having individual or even common knowledge about it.5 
However this minimal feeling of obligation can turn into a much 
stronger feeling of commitment once attention is shared. That is, the 
bidirectional communication in shared attention makes public the fact that 
attention is shared. We can refer to the instance of sharing afterwards and it is 
difficult to plausibly deny both the fact that attention was shared and any 
                                                   
5 We thank Sebastian Grueneisen (personal communication) for the examples highlighting how 
common, mutual, and shared knowledge heighten the pressure to follow social norms.  
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commitments or obligations following from this. This heightens substantially 
the pressure to follow norms in normative situations and facilitates social 
coordination above and beyond common and mutual attention.  
Another helpful function of shared attention is that it enables us to 
create a shared focus even to subtle things in complex environments, which 
might not be perceived as salient and/or relevant for both of us at first. This is 
not only helpful in supporting conversations and joint action, but in learning 
and other contexts as well (e.g., for infant language acquisition).  
Social attention is not only useful, but it can be a source of pleasure for 
us as well. This is especially pronounced for the shared attention level. It feels 
good to connect with others and to engage in shared attention (Schachter, 
1959); we often engage in shared attention just for the sake of the sharing itself 
(Gómez et al., 1993). Even as 1-year-old infants, we are so motivated to share 
attention with others that we will actually turn away from interesting sights to 
share them with others − the sharing is just as pleasurable (or even more so) 
than the sight itself. We have a feeling of ‘contact’ with the other, and 
consequently we may feel a “we feeling” which causes changes in our experience 
(Campbell, 2005). In shared attention, we build our shared common ground. 
We know what objects and events we have shared, and can refer to them in the 
future. Sharing attention might also cause an increased sense of similarity (with 
all the benefits that that entails; Haun & Over, 2013), which may emerge 
because paying attention to the same things/events/ideas might lead to 
thinking that whoever is interested in the same things I am is probably like me. 
Similarly, both initiation of shared attention and responding to shared 
attention signal an interest in the other – an interest in exploring the world 
together. With shared attention we can also express trust, openness, and 
intimacy. There are individual differences in the ease with which we share 
attention with others. The closeness of our relationship with our partner may 
increase the probability of smooth, mistake-free episodes, and, in turn, 
successful episodes of shared attention likely increase bonding (see also Wolf, 
Launay, & Dunbar, 2015).  
Thus, shared attention is important in forming attachments and sustaining 
positive interpersonal relationships. On the other hand, skilled deceivers can 
52 
 
 
exploit this to create an illusion of openness and use shared attention behaviors 
for deception in competitive or deceptive situations (e.g., being sure to make 
eye contact when lying).  
2.5 Future directions 
The next important step in social attention research is to come up with 
operational definitions of these levels so it will be possible to determine which 
levels different types of individuals, such as young children, animals, and social 
robots, can achieve. As social attention states cannot typically be measured 
directly, it is challenging to find the best ways of investigating them.  
One approach is to look for specific behaviors. The question is which 
behavior(s) should be considered as indicative of each of the levels. We have 
described some behaviors that typically accompany the levels above. However, 
these particular behaviors might differ across species and are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for identifying any given level. For example, turning one’s 
head/gaze in the direction of someone else’s could be a result either of low-level 
spatial cuing or monitoring or following someone else’s attention. And a quick 
glance between partners could either be an accidental meeting of the eyes or 
sharing attention via communicative but neutral eye contact (e.g., in a situation, 
such as in a group meeting, in which the signaler does not wish anyone other 
than the recipient to be able to discern his meaning). It might thus be helpful to 
focus on behavioral sequences, instead of isolated behaviors. An example of this 
could be looking at partners’ interaction history: for example, what preceded 
the quick glance between them, whether the glance was contingent on 
something salient for them, and what behaviors followed afterwards. However, 
quite often we do not have access to others’ interaction history or future 
interactions. And although useful, investigation only of observable behaviors 
without considering knowledge states cannot provide conclusive evidence about 
which levels different types of individuals can achieve. 
Another approach is to design studies in such a way that participants can 
only succeed on the task if they are engaging in a certain attention and 
knowledge level. For example, it could help to focus on individuals’ behavior in 
situations such as coordination dilemmas, in which their responses are 
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predicted by their attention and knowledge states. In these situations, shared 
attention and knowledge predicts the highest success rate in solving the 
dilemma compared to lower attention and knowledge states (for an example of 
this approach see Thomas et al., 2014). 
Still another approach is to experimentally manipulate characteristic 
features of the different levels in order to empirically test claims about, for 
example, what level of attention participants are in or the role of 
communication in achieving shared attention (see, e.g., Liszkowski, Carpenter, 
Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004; Moll, Richter, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2008; and Siposova, Tomasello, & Carpenter, 2018, for examples of this 
approach). Future studies could also systematically manipulate the type or 
degree of engagement and/or communication of one partner and measure the 
partners’ ability to establish the mutual or shared attention level. Here, again, 
the success of establishing the levels could be evaluated by placing participants 
in situations in which their responses are predicted by the attention level they 
achieve, or by self-reports in human older children and adults. 
Another important direction for future research is to determine which 
levels various types of individuals show. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
review this in depth, but next we sketch briefly how the proposed levels map 
onto the available findings in human infants, animals, and social robots. Note 
that as previous studies were not designed to distinguish among these levels, at 
this point it is not always possible to make firm conclusions about which levels 
different individuals can achieve.  
2.5.1 Which attention levels can different types of individuals 
achieve? 
2.5.1.1 Human infants and children  
A pre-condition for each of the four social attention levels is some 
understanding of attention, or at least perception. For example, minimally, it is 
necessary that individuals understand that when others are ‘looking at 
something,’ they are ‘seeing something.’ It has been proposed that already in 
their first months infants demonstrate an awareness of others’ attention by 
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producing emotional reactions when experiencing others’ attention to 
themselves (Reddy, 2003), and by decreasing smiling after interrupted eye 
contact at the age of 3 months (Hains & Muir, 1996). Even newborns look 
preferentially at faces with direct gaze (Farroni et al., 2002) and perceived gaze 
shifts trigger corresponding gaze shifts in 3-month-olds (Hood, Willen, & 
Driver, 1998). However, it is not clear how much infants understand about 
others’ attention at these young ages. It becomes clearer around 12 months of 
age that infants do have some understanding of others as capable of attending 
to things, when they follow the gaze of others to things that they cannot see 
themselves, for example around visual barriers and even to things behind them 
(e.g., Deák et al., 2000; Moll & Tomasello, 2004).  
Although we presented the levels from monitoring, to common, to 
mutual, to shared attention (representing the degree of jointness involved), 
interestingly, the latter two levels are seen earliest in development. Most 
researchers agree that joint attention develops between 9-12 months of age; 
however others have claimed that the beginnings of joint attention actually are 
seen well before this. For example, Rossmanith and colleagues have suggested 
that during a picture book activity, 3-month-old infants already coordinate 
their attention between the book and their caregiver, and that by 6 months they 
jointly communicate affectively about the activity (Rossmanith, Costall, 
Reichelt, López, & Reddy, 2014). Similarly, Striano and Bertin (2005) claimed 
that 5-month-olds engage in joint attention after observing that they alternate 
gaze between an object and a partner’s face. However, without any other 
supporting evidence of mutual or shared knowledge, the behavior of gaze 
alternation alone could be evidence of any of the levels: alternating individual 
attention between the object and the partner’s face, monitoring the partner’s 
attention, or common, mutual, or shared attention. So far, the earliest 
supporting evidence of shared attention with shared knowledge from 
experimental studies is with 1-year-old infants. Starting from at least 14 months 
of age, infants distinguish what objects they have and have not shared 
communicatively with their partner (Moll et al., 2008; see also Tomasello & 
Haberl, 2003) and use this knowledge both when pointing for others and when 
interpreting others’ pointing gestures (Ganea & Saylor, 2007; Liebal, Behne, 
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Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Liebal, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010; Saylor & 
Ganea, 2007). These experimental findings, and experimental findings showing 
that infants point to share interest (Liszkowski et al., 2004), together with the 
many observational findings of spontaneous production of declarative gestures 
beginning between 9-12 months (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998), provide strong 
evidence for the shared attention level. As previous studies have not 
distinguished between mutual and shared attention, whether these levels 
develop simultaneously is an open question for future research.  
So far the earliest experimental evidence of monitoring attention is with 
18-month-old infants. For example, 18-month-olds, but not 14-month-olds, 
could distinguish which objects an experimenter knew about when they 
observed, from a third-person perspective, the experimenter manipulating the 
objects (Moll & Tomasello, 2007b). At least from 18 months of age children also 
can learn novel words when they overhear an experimenter using them with 
someone else (Akhtar, Jipson, & Callanan, 2001; Floor & Akhtar, 2006). So far 
there is little if any evidence of young children manipulating attention in a 
third-person context (see Grosse, Scott-Phillips, & Tomasello, 2013 for the 
study that comes the closest to this). It might sound surprising that monitoring 
and manipulating attention may emerge relatively late in development, as many 
studies have found the parallel abilities of following and directing others’ 
attention in younger infants, but almost all of these studies were conducted in a 
second-person context. Thus it is not yet known exactly when the skills to 
monitor and manipulate others’ attention from a third-person perspective (that 
is, outside of a shared attention episode and without the active contribution of 
their partner) first emerge in infants.  
Similarly, common attention has not yet been directly investigated in 
infants – again the vast majority of infant studies take place within a second-
person context. Several findings suggest that adults engage in the common 
attention level, and that common attention has an impact on adults’ experience 
of the thing they are attending to, their relationship with their partner, and 
their ability to coordinate in social dilemmas (Boothby et al., 2014, 2016; 
Thomas et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2015). With young children, the closest study 
so far is a coordination study by Grueneisen, Wyman, and Tomasello (2015a). 
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This study investigated young children’s ability to choose the same of several 
options as a partner without being able to communicate with or see one 
another. Five-year-old and older children, but not 3-year-olds, successfully 
chose the same option. To solve the task, each child had to attend to the fact 
that one option was more salient than the others, that the other child was likely 
to perceive the same option as salient too, and to the fact that each knew that 
they each knew this. 
It thus seems that infants develop mutual and shared attention before 
they are able to understand others’ attention via observing and inferring it 
solely from a third-person perspective without any direct contact, although the 
claim that monitoring and common attention might develop later needs to be 
confirmed with future research. Several findings support the idea that the 
second-person relation is the primary relation in which infants develop their 
earliest social attention skills (Moll & Tomasello, 2007a; Peacocke, 2005; 
Reddy & Morris, 2004; Vygotsky, 1978). Moll and colleagues have directly 
contrasted infants’ ability to attend to others’ attention in a second- vs. a third-
person relation (Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007; Moll & Tomasello, 
2007b). They found that although 18-month-olds were able to do this in both 
situations, 14-month-olds recognized what their partner was attending to only 
when they were engaged with her in a second-person interaction, not when they 
were only observing her from a third-person perspective. Similarly, even within 
a second-person relation, infants show improved social attention skills in 
interactions with higher degrees of second-person engagement. For example, 
infants are much more likely to follow gaze shifts after their partner engages in 
eye contact (Farroni, Mansfield, Lai, & Johnson, 2003; Senju & Csibra, 2008) 
or points for them (Deák et al., 2000) compared to only seeing their partner’s 
gaze shifts or head turn.  
The crucial role of social attention in interactions is especially evident 
when social attention skills are impoverished. Children with autism show both 
quantitative and qualitative differences in many social attention skills 
compared to typically-developing children (for a review, see Bruinsma, Koegel, 
& Koegel, 2004). Based on a series of experimental studies, Hobson (1993, 
2005, 2007, 2014) has argued that these atypical behaviors are a result of 
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deficits in second-person engagement, specifically, in difficulties with 
experiencing others’ attitudes and emotions directly in interaction and thus 
identifying with one’s partner’s perspective. Further studies are needed to 
understand what children with autism know about others’ attention. Especially 
useful would be experiments investigating their ability to achieve shared 
knowledge.  
2.5.1.2   Nonhuman animals  
Again, to be able to engage in social attention, a pre-requisite is to have 
some understanding of other’s attention/perception. Numerous animal species 
show different reactions when others are looking towards vs. away from them, 
including lizards (Hennig, 1977), snakes (Burghardt & Greene, 1988), birds 
(Ristau, 1991), horses (Proops & McComb, 2009), dogs (Virányi, Topál, Gácsi, 
Miklósi, & Csányi, 2004), and many primates (for a review, see Emery, 2000). 
Many species are also able to follow the gaze (or at least head) direction of 
others, for example tortoises (Wilkinson, Mandl, Bugnyar, & Huber, 2010), 
goats (Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), dolphins (Pack & Herman, 
2006), horses (Proops & McComb, 2009), dogs (Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál, & 
Csányi, 1998), and again, many primates (for a review, see Emery, 2000). 
However, the degree to which some of these species understand others as 
attending to things remains an open question. Experiments testing animals’ 
ability to follow gaze to locations outside their own visual field provide clearer 
evidence that they have some understanding of others as capable of attending 
to things. For example, it has been shown that ravens (Bugnyar, Stowe, & 
Heinrich, 2004), wolves (Range & Virányi, 2011), dogs (Met, Miklósi, & 
Lakatos, 2014), monkeys (Amici, Aureli, Visalberghi, & Call, 2009) and all ape 
species (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2005) follow gaze behind barriers.  
Whether animals can engage in joint attention is a hotly-debated 
question. Most discussions focus on apes: Several researchers have argued that 
apes do engage in joint attention (e.g., Leavens & Bard, 2011; Leavens & Racine, 
2009; Tanner & Byrne, 2010), whereas others have argued that they do not 
(e.g., Carpenter & Call, 2013; Tomasello, 2006). Evidence taken in support of 
the idea that apes can engage in joint attention includes findings that gorillas 
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(Tanner & Byrne, 2010) and infant chimpanzees (Bard, Bakeman, Boysen, & 
Leavens, 2014) alternate gaze and gesture in triadic situations. Leavens and 
colleagues have also claimed that apes point declaratively (e.g., Leavens, 
Hopkins, & Bard, 2005; Leavens & Racine, 2009). In contrast, other studies 
have found little evidence of joint attention in apes, either when 
operationalizing joint attention as gaze alternations or declarative gestures 
(e.g., Bard & Vauclair, 1984; Carpenter, Tomasello, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995; 
Rivas, 2005; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; Tomonaga et al., 2004). 
However, as noted above for human infants, gaze alternation is not in 
itself diagnostic of any of the social attention levels. Furthermore, the few 
reported ‘declarative’ gestures in apes were either elicited by human caretakers 
(who told the apes to show them something) or were actually other, different 
types of gestures (e.g., informative, rather than declarative, gestures; Carpenter 
& Call, 2013). Although it is possible that informative and other types of 
gestures can involve joint attention, they need not do so. Further, experimental 
research is needed to determine what apes’ motivation is when gesturing, and 
whether, when communicating, they create a shared focus of attention (with 
shared knowledge) or whether instead they engage in a more unidirectional 
type of communication: manipulating, rather than directing or sharing, others’ 
attention.  
Future studies, along the lines of experiments conducted with human 
infants (e.g., Moll et al., 2008), are also needed to investigate apes’ ability to 
have mutual and shared knowledge with their partners (whether they be 
conspecifics or humans). For example, a recent study has claimed that apes 
likely have shared knowledge with their partner, because they modify their 
gestures according to the familiarity of the partner (Genty, Neumann, & 
Zuberbühler, 2015). However, further work would be needed to distinguish 
whether in this study apes were using individual knowledge about their 
partner’s knowledge (e.g., he knows this gesture – monitoring and 
manipulating attention) or shared knowledge (e.g., we know this gesture 
together – sharing and directing attention). 
Another useful approach is to conduct experiments in which participants 
can only succeed on the task if they are engaging in a certain attention and 
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knowledge level. This approach was used in a study by Duguid and colleagues 
(Duguid et al., 2014), and they found that unlike 4-year-old children, who 
spontaneously shared attention communicatively with their partner and thus 
solved a coordination problem, apes did not communicate before their 
decisions, and therefore were less successful.  
Finally, with regard to joint attention, it is an open question whether and 
to what degree apes (and other animals) adopt instrumental vs. engaged 
approaches towards their partner during interactions (Buber, 1958; Fuchs, 
2012; Reddy, 2018; Schilbach et al., 2013; compare with Gómez’s, 2005, 
distinction between different notions of others as subjects). Answering this 
question would help us to distinguish whether, when animals gesture, they are 
directing others’ attention to share it, or they are manipulating others’ 
attention.   
In contrast to human infants, with animals there is far more evidence of 
monitoring attention than shared attention. The experiments testing animals’ 
understanding of others’ knowledge provide the most direct evidence that these 
animals can monitor others’ attention from a third-person perspective. Dogs, 
for example, know what others can and cannot see (e.g., Kaminski, Pitsch, & 
Tomasello, 2013), and both monkeys (Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Santos, 
Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006) and apes (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; 
Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Melis, Call, & Tomasello, 2006) know what 
others can and cannot see and hear.  
Common attention has not yet been studied in other animals. Future 
research could adapt previous studies investigating what apes know about 
others’ knowledge (e.g., Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Kaminski et 
al., 2008) to include the additional step of testing what apes know about what 
others know about what they themselves know. 
2.5.1.3   Social robots 
Social attention abilities are critical in social robotics as well. Social 
robots have a rudimentary sense of what others can see and can track others’ 
attention in simplified environments (Lemaignan, Garcia, Jacq, & Dillenbourg, 
2016). So there is some limited evidence for skills of monitoring attention. 
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Robots’ subtle gaze shifts towards objects have been shown to influence human 
participants’ attention to objects even when they were unaware of the gaze 
shifts (Mutlu, Yamaoka, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2009). This finding 
provides some evidence that robots could be used to manipulate others’ 
attention. The use of social gaze is widely studied in social robotics, as it a key 
component in regulating human-robot interactions. For example, robots can 
use direct gaze to initiate a conversation, use gaze aversion to facilitate turn-
taking, and combine gaze with gestures and speech (for a review, see Admoni & 
Scassellati, 2017). Their repertoire can include intentionally communicative 
behaviors that are designed to evoke a feeling of shared attention in their 
human interaction partners, such as declarative pointing and vocalizations 
(“Look!”; Anzalone et al., 2014). Therefore, the behavioral prerequisites, at 
least, for the shared attention level seem satisfied. A main challenge for the 
development of future social robots is to work on the ability to acquire 
common, mutual, and shared knowledge, to interpret others’ ambiguous verbal 
or subtle nonverbal cues based on common ground in more complex 
environments, and to track shared experiences and integrate them into future 
interactions with others (for a review, see Yang et al., 2018). Another challenge 
is to identify what types of cues social robots and avatars need to produce in 
order to create at least an illusion of a second-person, engaged relation that 
humans will react to naturally (see, e.g., Anzalone, Boucenna, Ivaldi, & 
Chetouani, 2015; Breazeal & Scassellati, 2002; Castro-González, Admoni, & 
Scassellati, 2016; Lee, Breazeal, & DeSteno, 2017; Leite et al., 2017; Salem, 
Kopp, Wachsmuth, Rohlfing, & Joublin, 2012).  
2.5.2 Application of this typology to joint goals and other joint 
mental states  
We focus on attention and knowledge states here; however, the same 
typology can be extended to other mental states that can be either individual or 
joint (such as emotions, goals, desires, and beliefs) as well. Here we briefly 
sketch an idea of how the levels could apply to them, using different types of 
goals as an example. To achieve an individual goal, one intentionally organizes 
one’s own behavior to reach that goal. For example, while reading the 
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newspaper, Maria finds that she is strongly opposed to a law that has recently 
been passed. Her goal is to convince the president to veto the law. Maria stands 
in front of the president’s residence, and holds up a sign protesting against the 
controversial law.  
One can also monitor another’s goal, that is, infer someone else’s goal, 
adopt it as one’s own, and intentionally organize one’s behavior to reach it. For 
example, Maria overhears a colleague mentioning holding up a sign in front of 
the president’s residence. She adopts this goal, knowing that her colleague has 
the same goal.  
In contrast, two or more individuals can have the same goal and know 
this together. Again, we propose that it is useful to distinguish several types of 
such goals based on the ways the goals are created: via inference or via direct 
experience with or without communication. Consider this example of a 
common goal: Maria stands in front of the president’s residence with her sign. 
She sees that there are already several other people facing her holding similar 
signs on the other side of the residence, but she cannot go there as the police 
have blocked the streets. Maria realizes that they have the same goal, and that 
each of them will assume that they have a common goal with her. In a third-
person situation, individuals can have a common goal by making inferences 
about the situation and engaging in recursive reasoning. This can enable them 
to coordinate their actions towards their common goal, even in situations in 
which no direct contact is possible.  
To illustrate a mutual goal: Maria approaches the president’s residence 
with her sign, and she makes eye contact with the protesters already standing 
there. They quickly gaze away as they need to be vigilant about the police’s 
action. This mutual contact directly manifests to each of them that they realize 
that they have a mutual goal to convince the president to veto the law. Two 
individuals can have a mutual goal when they become directly and reciprocally 
aware, via attention contact in a second-person relation but without intentional 
communication, of their same goal.  
Once Maria talks to one of the protesters, “Let’s do this, veto the law!”, 
and he shouts back, “Yes!”, they establish a shared goal. Two individuals can 
establish a shared goal when they are in a second-person relation to each other, 
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while they are engaged in bidirectional intentional communication about the 
goal.  
In contrast to individual and monitored goals, common, mutual, and 
shared goals can give rise to additional, social obligations beyond one’s own 
individual feelings of obligations to achieve the goal. In common goals these 
additional obligations come from the fact that each of the individuals knows 
about their knowledge of the goal and thus plausible deniability about the goal 
is lower. The minimal openness in the mutual goal level makes the obligation to 
achieve the goal feel stronger than in the common goal level, and the 
communication in the shared goal level goes beyond this to enable both 
individuals to acknowledge the shared goal and their shared knowledge of it, 
thus not only highlighting their individual obligation to achieve the goal, but 
also creating interpersonal, joint commitments to each other about the joint 
goal (Siposova et al., 2018). That is, as soon as it turns into any type of joint 
goal, by definition (Bratman, 1999; Gilbert, 1990) there is some joint 
commitment to it – and the feeling of commitment is on a continuum just like 
with social attention and social knowledge. This feeling of joint commitment 
supports the achievement of joint goals, as it reduces uncertainty and we put 
more effort into fulfilling joint commitments (Michael & Pacherie, 2015). 
Extending the typology to other mental states such as emotions, goals, 
desires, and beliefs thus allows us to use consistent terminology across different 
mental states. It also accounts for both the observational (third person) and the 
experiential (second person) ways in which we understand and share the world 
with others. 
2.5.3 Other possible levels 
One final direction for future research and thinking is to consider 
whether, in addition to the levels described above, there might be further levels 
of social attention and knowledge, for example, a cultural or collective level in 
which we pay attention to the attention not only of our immediate social 
partners but also of the group as a whole. 
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2.6 Part I conclusion 
We argue here that we will be able to address the question of what joint 
attention is and how the jointness in it is achieved more productively if we 
distinguish several levels of social attention. We offer a systematic framework of 
social attention and knowledge levels in which we distinguish between two 
types of relations: reasoning about others as an outside observer from a third-
person perspective versus directly engaging with them within a second-person 
perspective. A key part of our proposal is the claim that we are not jointly 
attending to something with someone until we enter into a second-person 
relation with them. This usually involves communication (including simple 
communicative looks)—our shared attention level—but it does not always: 
Neutral, non-communicative eye contact (even accidental eye contact, if it is 
registered) can create a bidirectional connection (in our mutual attention level). 
This proposal contributes to both the psychological and the philosophical 
literature by suggesting that social attention is not a single process, but rather it 
consists of a cluster of different cognitive skills. This proposal also emphasizes 
the link between the different attention levels and their corresponding 
knowledge states and points to a need to study them together. We have pointed 
out that not only do the levels themselves lie on a scale of jointness, but there is 
a continuum of jointness within each of the social levels as well. This, as well as 
the fact that the levels can be nested hierarchically within a single episode, 
illustrates that social attention is far more complex than previously thought. 
These levels allow us to clearly see the gaps in our knowledge about social 
attention in different populations. It is also useful to distinguish these levels 
because of the different consequences they have in terms of what kinds of 
interactions and obligations they can support. First, monitoring attention itself 
is already an advanced social-cognitive skill, which gives advantages to the 
individuals capable of it, for example in making informed predictions about 
others’ future actions. Second, the common, mutual, and shared levels can 
support obligations and even commitments, each level with varying degrees of 
strength. Additionally, each of these levels presents a distinct way to solve social 
coordination dilemmas in different types of circumstances.  
64 
 
 
Social attention is an important topic in many disciplines, ranging from 
philosophy, to developmental, comparative, and social psychology, to 
psychopathology, to social robotics. To be able to compare new findings and 
exchange knowledge across these diverse disciplines effectively, we need to be 
sure that we are talking about the same psychological processes. With this in 
mind, we propose that carefully distinguishing between social attention and 
knowledge levels helps us to study this intriguing topic better. 
Although all the attention levels have the potential to facilitate 
coordination and cooperation, as discussed above, the shared attention level 
has the special importance in this. It allows partners to align actively their 
mental states about the co-attended object, and therefore create specific 
expectations about their partner’s future behaviors. The bidirectional 
communication in shared attention makes public the fact that attention is 
shared, which allows partners to refer to the instance of sharing afterwards. It is 
difficult to plausibly deny any obligations following from this. Thus, in the right 
context, attention sharing can lead not only to an expectation that one’s partner 
will cooperate, but even to the perception of a commitment. Part II examines 
the role of attention sharing in coordination. 
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3. Part II: The role of attention sharing in coordination 
Successful cooperation enables individuals to achieve greater goals than 
would be possible on their own. However, entering into cooperative 
interactions carries risks. The classic example is that if many people participate 
in a public demonstration, they can create change, but if only a few people 
participate, their effort may be wasted and they may be put in danger. As a 
potential demonstrator, before one takes the risk of showing up to participate, 
one needs to judge whether others will participate too. To reduce uncertainty 
about others’ behavior in cooperative interactions, communication and 
commitments are particularly useful tools (Michael & Pacherie, 2015). It has 
been shown that exchanging verbal commitments substantially increases 
successful cooperation in social dilemmas among adults (for a meta-analysis, 
see Sally, 1995).  
 Typically, commitments arise verbally through speech acts of promising 
or making agreements. For example, Peter can commit himself to washing the 
dishes after dinner by promising his wife he will do so. He then has an 
obligation to wash the dishes and his wife has the right to protest if he does not. 
Although different definitions of commitments exist, most involve this general 
formulation: If one social partner intentionally communicates to another that 
he intends to do X, and the other acknowledges this, then they have knowledge 
in common about this interaction, and the first partner is committed to do X 
(e.g., Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969; Scanlon, 1998).  
There is considerable debate among philosophers about how one key 
type of commitments, promises, function. The main point of contention is the 
explanation of how promissory obligations come into existence. Conventionalist 
theories argue that promising is a social practice involving convention, and that 
only certain verbal statements (e.g., “I promise to do X” or “I will do X”) or 
conventional acts (e.g., nodding) under the right circumstances will create 
promissory obligations (Hume, 1739–1740/1969; Kolodny & Wallace, 2003; 
Rawls, 1955; Searle, 1969). In contrast, most contemporary accounts reject the 
idea that the core of promises is rooted in social convention (Gilbert, 2004; 
Owens, 2006; Scanlon, 1998; Shiffrin, 2008). For example, Scanlon (1998) 
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argues that whenever one individual intentionally leads another to expect that 
he will do X (and knows that the other wants to be assured of X), he is 
committed to do X, as the general moral principle not to mislead others is in 
place. Similarly, MacCormick (MacCormick & Raz, 1972) has stressed the role 
of reliance: If one individual has intentionally induced another to rely on him, 
then he is committed to follow through. This is especially evident when the 
other individual takes detrimental action for herself based on her expectations 
of the first individual’s behavior. Somewhat differently, in a discussion of joint 
commitments,  Gilbert (1990, 2004, 2014) claims that promissory obligations 
are not necessarily moral obligations, but are sui generis form of normativity. 
In her view, commitments do not need to be construed verbally; they are 
created by each individual expressing readiness to be jointly committed under 
conditions of common knowledge.  
Therefore, although perhaps the easiest way to create promissory 
obligations is to state, “I promise to X,” these latter accounts suggest that 
commitments and promises could arise even without any words at all. It has 
been suggested that it would be useful to move away from the binary distinction 
between full-fledged verbal, explicit promises vs. not promises, and elucidate 
the full spectrum of promissory obligations (Shiffrin, 2008). Part of the debate 
is about what type of communication of an intention to bind oneself to do X is 
necessary to form promissory obligations (Gilbert, 2014; Owens, 2006; 
Scanlon, 1998; Shiffrin, 2008). To inform the theory in this area, we 
investigated empirically whether it is possible to commit oneself nonverbally, as 
long as intentional communication is involved (Raz, 1977). 
To our knowledge, these ideas have never been tested empirically. We 
hypothesized that a communicative look is an especially good candidate for a 
minimal, nonverbal signal that might be powerful enough not only to promote 
expectations of cooperation, but also to create a commitment. This type of eye 
contact is ostensive (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), bidirectional, public, and enables 
one to communicate a message under conditions of shared knowledge 
(Carpenter & Liebal, 2011), as long as the common ground is strong enough 
(Tomasello, 2008). Thus, within the context of a cooperative coordination 
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problem, here we test whether communicative, versus non-communicative, eye 
contact can signal a commitment to cooperate.   
We designed a game based on the Stag Hunt dilemma, an ideal model for 
studying social dilemmas in mutualistic contexts (Rousseau, 1754/1984; 
Skyrms, 2004). As explained in the introduction, in the Stag Hunt parable, two 
hunters decide either to each hunt a hare (a certain but small prize) individually 
or to hunt a stag (a risky but big prize) together, if it is available. However, if 
just one partner decides to cooperate and hunt the stag and the other decides to 
hunt a hare (e.g., because he does not know the stag is available), the 
cooperating partner loses the chance to get anything. Thus, successful 
cooperation in this context faces two main challenges: First, to reduce 
uncertainty about the partner’s knowledge (here, about the presence of the 
stag), and second, to reduce uncertainty about the partner’s behavior (whether 
he will cooperate).  
The first challenge is epistemological. It is not enough if each social 
partner knows individually that the cooperative option is available. Instead, 
successful coordination is facilitated by knowledge in common (Chwe, 2001; 
Clark, 1996), that is, each partner needs to know that the other knows about the 
cooperative option, that the other knows he knows, etc., ad infinitum (e.g., 
Lewis, 1969). However, as the processing demands for even just a few levels of 
such recursive reasoning are high, it is likely that we use simpler shortcuts such 
as communication for creating knowledge in common (Clark, 1996). It has been 
shown that adults (Brosnan, Wilson, & Beran, 2012) and 4-year-old children 
(Duguid et al., 2014) spontaneously use verbal communication to achieve 
knowledge in common and solve the Stag Hunt dilemma successfully. Some 
authors have proposed that knowledge in common can be created by nonverbal 
signals like eye contact (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; Chwe, 2001; Gómez, 1996; 
Thomas et al., 2014); however, empirical evidence for this in children or adults 
is scare. As mentioned in the introduction, Wyman et al., (2013) studied the 
ability of a communicative look with a smile to create knowledge in common 
about the presence of the cooperative option in a Stag Hunt game. In this study, 
4-year-old children were discouraged from communicating verbally while 
playing this game with an experimenter. In the control condition, when the 
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cooperative option appeared, the experimenter monitored it – it was clear that 
she saw it – but she did not look at children, whereas in the experimental 
condition, she alternated gaze ostensively between the cooperative option and 
children’s eyes while smiling. More children decided to cooperate in the 
experimental than the control condition, suggesting that this minimal 
nonverbal behavior established shared knowledge about the availability of the 
cooperative option.  
Wyman et al. (2013) thus provide the first hint that nonverbal signals 
can serve to create shared knowledge in a collaborative decision-making 
situation. However, many open questions remain about what exactly caused 
children to behave differently in the two conditions of that study. For example, 
did the eye contact alone generate knowledge in common or was it the 
communication inherent in the look and/or smile? It has been argued that one 
cannot truly share attention to something, or know something together with 
one’s partner, without some form of communication – even if just a 
communicative look (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; Siposova & Carpenter, 
submitted). Thus in the current studies, our first aim was to test the hypothesis 
that communicative looks (but not non-communicative looks) help establish 
shared knowledge about the cooperative option, and therefore lead children to 
expect cooperation from their partner and thus to decide to risk cooperation.  
The second challenge for cooperation is to reduce uncertainty about 
one’s partner’s behavior, and it has been suggested that commitments and 
promises are a key way of stabilizing cooperative behavior (Michael & Pacherie, 
2015). Children begin to engage in collaborative activities with complementary 
roles and joint goals around two years of age (Brownell, 2011), but a basic 
understanding of commitments and at least some of the resulting obligations 
develops somewhat later, by the age of three – not coincidentally, at around the 
same age that children begin to show an understanding of social norms 
regarding moral transgressions (e.g., Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Vaish, Missana, 
& Tomasello, 2011), fairness (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013), and simple game 
rules (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). For example, after verbally 
making a joint commitment to cooperate, 3-year-olds understand some of the 
obligations that both they and their partner have to keep playing (Gräfenhain, 
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Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) and protest when their partner 
intentionally defects (Kachel, Svetlova, & Tomasello, 2017). Preschoolers also 
understand promissory obligations: They tend to keep their own promises and 
refer to the promise that was made when their partners do not keep their 
promises (Heyman, Fu, Lin, Qian, & Lee, 2015; Kanngiesser, Kӧymen, & 
Tomasello, 2017). To our knowledge, all studies with children and adults 
investigating commitments focus on commitments made verbally. Therefore, 
our second aim was to investigate whether young children can understand even 
minimal nonverbal communicative signals as commitments to cooperate. 
3.1   Study 1 
In Study 1 we investigated to what extent a communicative, versus a 
non-communicative, look can produce an expectation of collaboration. While 
playing a novel version of the Stag Hunt game, 5-year-old children needed to 
decide whether to risk cooperating or take the safe option and play individually. 
At the critical moment, children saw that the cooperative option was available, 
but – unlike in the Wyman et al. (2013) study – they were not sure if the 
experimenter could see it as well. Thus, children were not able to assume 
knowledge in common about the presence of the cooperative option. 
Immediately before children needed to make their decision, depending on the 
condition, the experimenter either silently shared attention with them—she 
made ostensive, communicative eye contact—or looked non-communicatively 
at them. We predicted that only communicative looks would establish 
knowledge in common and promote cooperative decisions. We also investigated 
whether attention sharing via the communicative look could be seen by 
children as a commitment on the experimenter’s part to collaborate. To do this, 
in both conditions the experimenter ended up playing for the individual option, 
and we gave children the chance to protest as a sign that they understood that 
their partner had broken a commitment to collaborate.  
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3.1.1 Method  
3.1.1.1 Participants  
Seventy-two 5-year-olds (36 girls, mean age: 5;2; range: 4;11-5;6) were 
included in the final sample. Additional children began testing but did not 
complete the training due to language difficulties (2) or failing the pre-tests 
(11). Other children were tested but excluded from analyses for not seeing the 
manipulation (5), disobeying instructions and communicating their decision to 
the experimenter (13), apparatus failure (3), or experimenter error (10). We 
recognize that this drop-out rate is higher than usual, and we attribute this to 
the complexity of the procedure and children’s difficulty at inhibiting 
communication with the experimenter during the response phase (for more 
justification about why excluding these children was necessary, see below). 
Children’s parents had given consent for them to participate in developmental 
studies. They were tested individually in their kindergartens in Leipzig. The 
university’s ethics committee approved the study.  
3.1.1.2 Materials and design  
The apparatus for the game consisted of four tubes mounted at a 
downward angle towards a platform with boxes on it (see Figure 4). Two white 
tubes led to two white paper boxes representing the small prizes (i.e., the 
‘hares’, the safe, individual option). Two colorful tubes led to one colorful 
wooden box representing the big prize (i.e., the ‘stag’, the risky, collaborative 
option). Children’s partner was played by a puppet (controlled by an 
experimenter [E1]), because previous studies have shown that children are 
more likely to protest about the misbehavior of a puppet than that of an adult 
(e.g., Rakoczy et al., 2008). Behind the boxes sat another experimenter (E2) 
who operated the platform with boxes. The white boxes were always available, 
and the colorful box only occasionally also appeared in the middle. Children 
and the puppet could win the prizes by putting a marble into one of their two 
tubes, such that it rolled down the tube and knocked down the prize. There 
were small pegs in the tubes to prevent the marbles from rolling down the tubes 
until E2 gave permission for them to be released. Paper pictures of birds (3x3 
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cm) were used as the small prizes and, during training, nice stickers (3x3 cm) 
were used as the big prizes. Before the test phase, these nice stickers were 
replaced with ‘special’ stickers (4x4 cm) as the big prizes. Between children and 
the puppet there was a low barrier, so neither could see what the other chose, 
but they could both see each other’s face. Another small occluder partially 
blocked the puppet’s view of the colorful box, thus leaving children uncertain 
about the puppet’s knowledge regarding the appearance of the big prize. 
 
Figure 4. The apparatus with four tubes, two small prizes (the white boxes), one 
big prize (the colorful box), a partial occluder in front of the big prize on the 
puppet’s side, and a barrier between the puppet and the child. 
 
3.1.1.3 Procedure  
Training: Children were picked up from their classroom by E1, who 
introduced herself and the puppet. As they entered the testing room, E2 
introduced herself and a small stuffed animal – a cat from a popular children’s 
cartoon, and familiarized the child with a smiley scale that would be used at the 
end of the procedure. Then children played a warm-up game with the puppet. 
The puppet performed three actions incorrectly (e.g., wrote with the wrong end 
of a pen) and children were encouraged by E2 to correct her.  
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Then E2 introduced the main game to children and the puppet. She 
showed children and the puppet that they could win prizes by putting a marble 
into one of two tubes to knock down one of two boxes. E2 introduced the partial 
occluder, and the puppet said that sometimes she could see the big prize and 
sometimes not but that she could always see the small prize. During training, 
children received four types of trials:  In the trials in which the puppet can see 
the big prize, she said, “Look, the colorful box! Let’s play together, [child’s 
name], so we can get a colorful sticker.” In the trials in which she could not see 
the big prize, she said aloud to herself, “I can just see the white box. So I’ll play 
alone to knock down the white box,” and she put her marble in the tube for the 
white box quickly so she could not change her decision if children corrected her. 
In the only small prizes trials, the puppet said, “Look, [child’s name], only 
white boxes.” In a single child alone trial, the puppet excused herself for a 
moment, and children played the fourth trial alone. This trial served as a first 
pre-test to ensure that children understood that it was not possible to get the 
big prize alone. To pass this pre-test, they needed to play for the small prize, 
even though the big prize appeared as well. If children decided to play for the 
big prize, E2 explained the rules of the game again, started training from the 
beginning, and children were given one additional chance to pass this pre-test. 
The training trials were presented in the following order:  puppet can see the 
big prize, puppet cannot see the big prize, only small prizes, child alone, only 
small prizes, puppet cannot see the big prize, puppet can see the big prize, only 
small prizes. Of these, together the puppet can and cannot see the big prize 
trials served as the second pre-test, ensuring that children were motivated to 
play for the big prize when the puppet was likely to play for it but did not play 
for it when the puppet could not see it. If children did not play appropriately in 
any given trial, additional feedback was provided, and the trial was repeated 
once. To pass this pre-test, children had to play appropriately on the first or 
second attempt of each of these types of trials. Children who failed any of the 
pre-tests played one more cooperative trial, received a special sticker, and were 
thanked for playing so nicely and escorted back to class. For children who 
passed the pre-tests, before the last training trial, E2 showed children and the 
puppet a new, special sticker that would serve as the next big prize. Then E2 
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introduced a no-talking rule to prevent children from verbal communication 
about their decisions. E2 pretended that the cat wanted to sleep and said, 
“From now on, we have to be very quiet, and you can’t talk to each other 
anymore so [cat’s name] can sleep. This is a very important rule, okay? But 
don’t worry; you can still see each other’s faces so you will still be able to keep 
playing.” Then a final small prize trial was conducted in order to make sure 
children would follow the no-talking rule. 
Test phase: There was just one test trial. Children and the puppet 
watched while the platform with both the small and the big prizes on it 
appeared. Children could see the big prize but were not sure if the puppet could 
see it too. The puppet turned so she was facing children and, because E1’s eyes 
were more expressive than the puppet’s, E1 performed two looking sequences 
with her face next to and moving in tandem with that of the puppet. To be 
included in the analyses, children had to make eye contact with E1 at least once 
during the manipulation.  
In the communicative look condition, E1 shared attention with children: 
she made eye contact with them with an ostensive-communicative look. She 
opened her eyes widely and raised her eyebrows (see Figure 5a). This look 
potentially communicated the message, “I can see the big prize, let’s cooperate,” 
thus establishing shared knowledge about the availability of the cooperative 
option. Then E1 looked back to the prizes. E2 gave a marble to each of them, 
and looked down. E1 repeated the communicative look, looked down to the 
openings of the tubes ambiguously (so children could not use her gaze direction 
to figure out how she would play), and the puppet put her marble into a tube, 
out of sight of children.  
In the non-communicative look condition, each of the two looking 
sequences was split into two parts, with two shorter looks instead of one long 
one, since longer looks were judged as communicative by adults during 
informal piloting. After the prizes appeared, E1 (with a neutral, relaxed face) 
slowly turned her head in the direction of the child, made non-communicative 
eye contact with the child (i.e., neutrally, without raised eyebrows; see Figure 
5b), and then continued on, looking past children’s eyes and slightly to the side 
(approximately 30 cm from children’s eyes). E1 then followed a similar path 
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back to looking at the prizes, making eye contact a second time while doing so. 
After taking the marble, E1 repeated the same gaze path, but after passing 
children’s eyes at the end, E1 looked just slightly to the side (approximately 10 
cm from children’s eyes). Then E1 looked down and the puppet played exactly 
as in the other condition. We included the looks to the side to make the eye 
contact seem less communicative.6  
Children then needed to decide whether to play individually or 
cooperatively. In both conditions the puppet played for the individual option. 
Then E2 informed children that they were allowed to talk again and they could 
remove the pegs to release the marbles. At this point, E1 went back to holding 
the puppet in front of her face so that anything children said next would be 
directed to the puppet. Children who played individually received the small 
prize, and went directly to the questioning phase (see below). Children who 
played for the big prize saw that their marble did not knock down the big prize 
and that the puppet, who had played individually, knocked down the small 
prize. The puppet and E2 then provided increasingly specific cues to elicit a 
response from children. First, E2 said, “Oh,” in a slightly surprised way. After 
10 s, E2 asked, “What happened?”, alternating gaze between children and the 
puppet. After 10 more s, the puppet said, “You, [child’s name], tried to knock 
down the colorful box, but I knocked down the white box.” After 10 more s, the 
puppet asked, “And what do you say about this?” E2 gave children an additional 
10 s to respond, and then the puppet excused herself and left the room. 
  
                                                   
6 We noticed, belatedly, that, following a holiday break in testing, there were some errors in E1’s 
looks: In the communicative look condition, she began smiling slightly and in the non-communicative 
look condition she sometimes neglected to look away to the side after looking at children’s eyes. It was 
necessary to drop these children because different information was provided to them, and the non-
communicative looks seemed more communicative. We assessed interrater reliability on this coding 
decision by having an independent, naive coder code ten cases that the authors determined to be 
experimenter errors and ten other, randomly-selected cases in matching conditions. There was good 
agreement (Cohen’s κ=0.75), and the few disagreements between the naive coder and the authors about 
the drop outs were resolved by discussion. 
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Figure 5. A depiction of a) the communicative look and b) the non-
communicative look. 
 
Questioning phase and debriefing: To gain more insight into children’s 
thinking, we asked children several exploratory questions about, for example, 
their expectations and feelings for the puppet (see Result section 3.1.2.4 for 
these questions). Then E2 told children that they had played well and gave 
them the special sticker from the test trial. E1 apologized for playing 
incorrectly, and thanked children for playing. 
3.1.1.4  Coding and reliability  
The main coding was done from the video-recordings. To assess inter-
rater reliability, an independent coder who was naive to the hypotheses coded a 
random sample of 25% of the children in each condition.  
Cooperation vs. individual play: The main measure was whether 
children decided to cooperate. During the test trial, children’s behavior was 
coded as either cooperation (if they put their marble into the colorful tube 
leading to the big prize) or individual play (if they put their marble into the 
white tube leading to the small prize). There was perfect inter-rater agreement 
on this measure. 
Normative protest: We predicted that if children understood the 
communicative look as a commitment to cooperate, then they should protest 
b) a) 
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more in the communicative look condition than in the non-communicative look 
condition. However, it was important to ensure that if this were the case, it was 
not simply because children were less successful (and thus more upset) in the 
communicative look condition, i.e., because they decided to cooperate more in 
this condition and so did not receive a prize. Thus for this and the subsequent 
measures exploring children’s responses to their partner’s decision to play 
individually, all responses from the test phase were transcribed and coded only 
for the subset of children in both conditions who had decided to cooperate. In 
that way, children’s decision, and, importantly, their experience of not receiving 
a prize, were identical. Normative protest was coded when children used 
normative vocabulary (e.g., “should,” “must,” “wrong”) while referring to how 
the puppet played; for example, “You should knock down the colorful box!” 
There was perfect inter-rater agreement.  
Children’s verbal responses to their partner’s decision to play 
individually: To further examine how strong children’s expectation was that 
their partner would cooperate, for the subset of children who decided to 
cooperate, along with normative protests, verbal utterances during the test 
phase were additionally coded for the following exhaustive but non-exclusive 
responses: (a) Explicit expectation of cooperation: children said they expected 
that the puppet would play for the big prize, for example, “I thought that you 
knocked down the colorful one.” (b) Negative evaluation of the puppet: 
Children expressed frustration directed to the puppet, for example, “I think this 
is a little stupid.” (c) Other: Children did not produce a response falling into 
either of the above categories (e.g., stayed silent or just described what 
happened). There was perfect inter-rater agreement.  
Children’s nonverbal responses to their partner’s decision to play 
individually: In addition to verbal statements indicating that children had 
expected the puppet to collaborate, for the same subset of children we also 
coded nonverbal signs of this: displacement behaviors, disappointment, and/or 
anger during the response period. Behaviors were mutually exclusive and the 
exact frequency for each behavior that occurred during the response period was 
recorded. We predicted that if children had stronger expectations about their 
partner’s cooperation in the communicative look condition, they should show 
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more nonverbal signs that their expectations were violated in this condition. 
We used the Ethological Coding System for Interviews to code displacement 
behaviors (e.g., touching face, scratching, licking lips; Troisi, 2002). 
Displacement behaviors are self-directed activities that occur in situations 
characterized by stress and/or social tension, and which correlate with self-
reported anxiety and negative affect (Troisi, 2002). They are thus a useful 
measure of violation of social expectations. We also coded for signs of 
disappointment (e.g., frown, disappointed voice, slumped body posture) and 
anger (e.g., clenched lips, annoyed voice or look, angry body posture, e.g., 
hands-on-hips gesture or raising fist at the puppet; adapted from Cole, Zahn-
Waxler, & Smith, 1994). Reliability was excellent for the number of both 
displacement behaviors (rs=0.92, with no difference between coders, Wilcoxon 
signed rank test: p=0.31) and expressions of disappointment (rs=0.83, with no 
difference between coders, Wilcoxon signed rank test: p=1). No reliability 
coding for anger was conducted because only one such behavior was coded, and 
therefore anger was not included in the analysis. For statistical analyses, a 
composite score for nonverbal signs of violation of expectation of cooperation 
was calculated by summing the number of displacement and disappointment 
behaviors together (each behavior was equally-weighted).  
Children’s contribution to the mutual look in the communicative look 
condition: We also studied children’s own contributions to the communicative 
look by investigating whether children contributed to the mutual gaze with a 
communicative behavior of their own. If so, by doing this, children would 
explicitly acknowledge their partner’s commitment and/or even make a 
commitment back to her, thereby creating a joint commitment. We predicted 
that children who responded to their partner’s communicative looks in this way 
would be even more likely to protest than children who did not. Children’s 
reactions to the communicative look were coded as: raising their eyebrows, 
nodding (after receiving the look from E1), or no communicative behaviors. 
There was perfect inter-rater agreement on this measure. For the analyses, a 
binary outcome variable – whether or not each child produced a 
communicative behavior – was used. 
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Supplementary post-test questions: For exploratory purposes, to gain 
more information about children’s behaviors, we asked children a series of 
questions at the end of the procedure. Reliability revealed excellent agreement 
for all measures (Cohen’s κ’s ranged from 0.90-1). 
3.1.2 Results  
3.1.2.1 Cooperation vs. individual play  
Children in the communicative look condition overwhelmingly decided 
for cooperation: 78% of them played cooperatively (28 children cooperated, 8 
played individually, binomial probability, p= 0.001). In contrast, in the non-
communicative look condition, only 47% of children played cooperatively (17 
children cooperated, 19 played individually). Children in the communicative 
look condition cooperated significantly more often than children in the non-
communicative look condition (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.01; odds ratio=3.83).  
3.1.2.2   Protests and other responses to the partner’s decision to play 
individually 
 Only one child in each condition normatively protested after finding out 
that the puppet did not cooperate. Similarly, only a few children verbally 
expressed expectations of cooperation and/or negative evaluations of the 
puppet (see Table 2), thus no analyses were performed on these measures. 
However, for nonverbal signs of violation of expectation, there was a significant 
effect of condition: Children showed more nonverbal signs of violation of 
expectation in the communicative look condition (M=3.75, range=0-10, 
SD=2.50) than in the non-communicative look condition (M=1.65, range=0-4, 
SD=1.54, Welch’s t-test: t=3.29, df=40, p=0.002, n1=28, n2=17).  
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Table 2 
Percentage of Children who Showed the Different Verbal Response Types 
During the Test Phase in Study 1. 
 
Response types 
 
Communicative 
look condition 
 
 
Non-
communicative 
look condition 
 
Normative protests 
 
4% 
 
6% 
 
Explicit expectations of cooperation  
 
14% 
 
0% 
 
Negative evaluations of the puppet  
 
14% 
 
12% 
 
Other 
 
 
71% 
 
88% 
Note:  Only the subset of children who played cooperatively are included  
(N=28 in the communicative look condition, N=17 in the non-communicative 
look condition). 
 
3.1.2.3   Children’s contribution to the mutual look in the communicative look 
condition 
Twenty-five percent of children in the communicative look condition 
showed some communicative signs (8 children raised their eyebrows and 1 
raised the eyebrows and nodded) during the mutual look. As only one child 
normatively protested, no analyses were performed to investigate whether 
children who responded with communicative behaviors to E1 were more likely 
to protest than children who did not. The one child who protested did raise his 
eyebrows during the look.  
3.1.2.4   Supplementary results for the post-test questions  
At the beginning of the interview phase, E2 asked the child, “How do you 
feel right now?” and she pointed to and asked about each choice on the 5-point 
smiley scale (ranging from 1 “Do you feel very sad?” to 5 “Do you feel very 
happy?”). With this question, we wanted to investigate differences in mood 
between conditions within the subset of children who cooperated. Stronger 
expectations in the communicative look condition could lead to stronger 
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disappointment when the puppet did not cooperate, which in turn could be 
reflected in children’s mood. However, most children felt quite happy and there 
was no difference between conditions in children’s mood (communicative look 
condition: M=4.14, SD=1.41; non-communicative look condition: M=4.47, 
SD=0.87; Welch’s t-test: t=-0.49; df=38, p=0.63, n1=28, n2=17). 
Then E2 continued, “Think back to the last round of the game when the 
boxes appeared, but before you put your marble into the tube. In that moment, 
what did you first think: In which tube would [puppet’s name] put her marble?” 
We coded whether children expected: (a) Cooperation: Children mentioned, 
pointed at, or touched the colorful tube, or (b) Individual play: Children 
mentioned, pointed to, or touched the white tube, (c) Do not know: Children 
explicitly said they did not know or shrugged their shoulders, or (d) Other: 
Children said something that did not fit into any of these categories or stayed 
silent. (Note that the definitions for (c) and (d) are the same for all questions 
below.) In the communicative look condition, 61% of children expected 
cooperation, 33% expected individual play and 6% provided other answers. In 
the non-communicative look condition, 47% of children expected cooperation, 
50% expected individual play and 3% answered that they did not know. To 
investigate whether children’s responses differed between conditions, we 
analyzed whether in the communicative look condition more children answered 
that they expected cooperation. Three children did not answer that they 
expected either cooperation or individual play and were therefore excluded 
from this and the next analysis. There was no significant difference between 
conditions (χ2(1)=1.83, p=0.17). One reason for this might be that we asked the 
post-test questions after children had seen that the puppet had played 
individually. Therefore, some children might have adjusted their answers based 
on the puppet’s actual behavior. We also looked at the whole sample to see 
whether children’s decision in the test trial was driven by their expectations 
about what the puppet would do. We analyzed whether children who expected 
that the puppet would cooperate cooperated more themselves. Across 
conditions the results showed that children who expected the puppet to play 
cooperatively cooperated significantly more (74%) than children who expected 
the puppet to play individually (26%, χ2(1)=14.87, p<0.001). These results 
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support the idea that children based their decision to cooperate or not on their 
expectations about their partner’s behavior. 
To investigate the reasons why children played in a certain way, E2 
asked the next two questions: “Why did you expect her to do that?” and “And 
why did you put your marble into the white/colorful tube in the last round?” 
Both were coded for indications that children thought that their partner would 
play either cooperatively or individually: (a) I thought she saw/wanted/would 
play for the colorful box: Children said they thought that the puppet had seen 
the colorful box or that she would like to cooperate or to play together. (b) I 
thought she did not see/did not want/would not play for the colorful box: 
Children said the puppet had not seen the colorful box or she would like to play 
individually or put her marble into the white tube, (c) Do not know, or (d) 
Other. Overall, the majority of children (79% for the first of these two questions 
and 67% for second one) could not answer these two questions or provided 
unrelated explanations, thus no further analysis on them was conducted. 
Then, E2 asked, “How much do you like [puppet’s name]?” and again 
showed and stepped through the smiley scale. The scores ranged from 1 (“Do 
you not like her at all?”) to 5 (“Do you like her very much?”) With this question, 
we wanted to examine differences in children’s liking of the puppet within the 
subset of children who cooperated. Stronger expectations of cooperation in the 
communicative look condition might result in these children liking the puppet 
less than children in the non-communicative look condition. However, we did 
not find a significant difference between conditions (Welch’s t-test: t=-0.30; 
df=33; p=0.77; n1=28; n2=16). Most children liked the puppet at least a bit 
(communicative look condition: M =4.14, SD=1.01; non-communicative look 
condition: M=4.25, SD=0.93.) One explanation for why we did not find a 
difference in children’s mood (in the first question) and their liking of the 
puppet is that these questions were not asked immediately after children found 
out that the puppet did not cooperate, and that any initial differences might 
have diminished after a short period of time.  
After these questions, E2 told children that they had played well and 
gave them the special sticker from the test trial. Then, E2 asked them again how 
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they felt (to make sure that no children felt bad before going back to class). 
Children generally felt either a little happy or very happy (M=4.65, SD=0.75).  
Then, E1 (without the puppet) came back into the room, and after E2 
made all the prizes appear on the platform, E1 enacted for children the 
communicative and the non-communicative looks in turn, in counterbalanced 
order. While doing so she asked, “When I look at you like this, what do you 
think this look means?” If children did not provide a relevant answer 
spontaneously (i.e., mentioning her ability, or lack of ability, to see the big prize 
box, or mentioning cooperation or individual play), she continued and asked, 
“Do you think I can see the colorful box when you see this look?” Then, she 
enacted the other look and asked the same questions. For both of these 
questions together, for each look separately, we coded for the following 
responses: (a) Yes/E1 can see the big prize: Children mentioned the colorful 
box or referred to the collaborative choice in some other way or answered yes to 
the second question, or (b) No/E1 cannot see the big prize: Children mentioned 
the white box or the individual choice in some other way or answered no to the 
second question. We found that after seeing the communicative look, 80% of 
children answered correctly that E1 could see the big prize, and after seeing the 
non-communicative look 68% of children answered correctly that E1 could not 
see the big prize (exact binomial tests revealed that these were both 
significantly better than chance, p<0.001 and p=0.003, respectively). This 
result further supports the idea that children recognized different meanings in 
these two types of eye contact and interpreted them correctly. 
Finally, we were interested in investigating whether children evaluated 
E1’s play differently in the different conditions. Therefore, at the very end, E1 
asked, “[Child’s name], do you think I played incorrectly in the last round? 
Children’s responses were coded as: (a) Yes (also when children said things like 
“a little” or “a bit”), (b) No, (c) Do not know, or (d) Other.  The majority of 
children in both conditions answered that they did not think that E1 played 
incorrectly (communicative condition: 64%; non-communicative look 
condition: 72%) and there was no difference between conditions (χ2 (3)=2.38, 
p=0.50). It is perhaps puzzling that most children in the communicative look 
condition answered that they did not think that E1 played incorrectly. Children 
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clearly understood that the communicative look suggested that E1 would play 
cooperatively so they easily could have interpreted E1’s individual play as 
incorrect.  We think it likely that children did indeed believe that E1 played 
incorrectly, but were simply unwilling to tell her this to her face. Another 
possibility is that children interpreted E1’s decision as unfair, but not 
necessarily incorrect.  
3.1.3 Discussion of Study 1 
At the crucial moment in a coordination game, when children needed to 
decide whether to play cooperatively or individually, the type of eye contact 
children’s partner made with them influenced the inferences they made about 
their partner’s likely behavior. The main finding was that children chose to 
cooperate more often when their partner looked at them with a communicative, 
compared to a non-communicative, look. When deciding whether to risk 
cooperating, children had to consider two important pieces of information: 
first, whether their partner had seen that the cooperative option was available 
and, second, whether she would then decide to cooperate. Therefore, children 
could interpret her ostensive-communicative look as a signal that she had seen 
the cooperative option and/or as a signal that she was going to cooperate. It is 
difficult to distinguish between these two interpretations because both 
implicitly include each other. For example, it was enough for the partner to 
signal that she had seen the cooperative option, because both children and the 
puppet knew together that cooperation was better for both partners and thus it 
was reasonable to assume cooperation would follow as long as both partners 
knew together that the cooperative option was available.  
In addition, we found that children in the communicative look condition 
showed more nonverbal signs of violation of expectation when their partner 
played individually than children in the non-communicative look condition. 
This suggests that, even when children did cooperate in the non-communicative 
look condition, they had weaker expectations about the likelihood of their 
partner’s cooperation.  
Around half of the children cooperated even in the non-communicative 
condition. This is comparable to the cooperation rate in the Wyman et al. 
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(2013) study, in which 48% of children cooperated in a condition with no eye 
contact. Note that behavior in a coordination game is dependent on both the 
probability of getting the prizes and the values of both types of prizes. The big 
prize was appealing and children were highly motivated to play for it, thus they 
were likely to err on the side of false positives. The chance-level cooperation 
rates in this condition suggest that either children were not sure what the non-
communicative look meant and simply guessed what to do or half the children 
assumed their partner would play individually and half cooperatively. 
Counter to our expectations, we found almost no normative protests 
about the partner’s decision to not cooperate. Although at first most of the 
children interpreted the communicative look correctly as a signal to cooperate, 
they then saw that the puppet played individually. This might have led them to 
reinterpret their initial understanding of the communicative look. That is, as 
children have a general expectation that adults are competent (e.g., Taylor, 
Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991), and an adult was controlling the puppet, they 
might have concluded that they had mistakenly interpreted the meaning of the 
look, and, instead of blaming the puppet/adult, may have blamed themselves 
for the coordination’s failure.  
In this study we clearly demonstrated that after seeing the 
communicative look, children had a strong expectation that their partner would 
cooperate, and therefore decided to cooperate themselves. However, because 
children rarely protested in this, here we could not demonstrate that children 
understood the communicative look as a commitment on the looker’s part to 
cooperate. We should note here that only the child who protested normatively 
in the communicative look condition referred implicitly to a communicated 
commitment: “But you said [child mimics the communicative look]. For sure 
you picked the wrong hole.” This suggests that some children might understand 
the communicative look as a commitment to cooperate. In order to investigate 
this further, we conducted Study 2.  
3.2 Study 2 
Some theorists would argue that a look cannot serve as a promissory 
commitment, since it is not a conventional act (Hume, 1739-1740/1969; Rawls, 
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1955; Searle, 1969). However, if, as others argue, promising is not rooted in 
social convention (Gilbert, 2004; Owens, 2006; Scanlon, 1998; Shiffrin, 2008), 
it is feasible that under certain circumstances a communicative look could be 
sufficient for establishing a commitment, as it involves the promiser 
intentionally communicating in such a way as to induce the recipient to rely on 
her (MacCormick & Raz, 1972; Scanlon, 1998), and allows individuals to 
express readiness to commit under conditions of shared knowledge (Gilbert, 
1990, 2004, 2014). To inform this theoretical discussion, we attempted again to 
find evidence that commitments can be created nonverbally. We manipulated 
the type of look children’s partner gave them at the critical decision-making 
point in a coordination game and we focused more precisely on children’s 
protests when they learned that their partner did not cooperate.  
We modified the procedure in several ways to make protesting more 
likely to occur. First, we tested slightly older children: 6- to 7-year-olds. During 
the transition between preschool and early school age, children become more 
sensitive to the contexts in which norms apply, and their explicit reasoning 
about social norms becomes more advanced (Riggs & Young, 2016; Smith, 
Blake, & Harris, 2013). Therefore, we reasoned that slightly older children 
might feel more confident about protesting when their partner did not 
cooperate. Second, to make it less likely that children would blame themselves 
for the breakdown in coordination, we made the game easier and got rid of the 
occluder (so children were no longer uncertain about their partner’s 
knowledge). Third, for children’s partner we did not use a puppet, but rather an 
adult experimenter. To reduce children’s inhibition about protesting towards 
adults, in a training phase, in both conditions, we encouraged children to 
protest when she behaved incorrectly. Finally, we made the cooperative option 
both more appealing and always available, so children in both conditions had a 
reason to expect cooperation and to cooperate. We did this because the rate of 
normative protesting in studies with young children is generally low, so to be 
able to detect any differences between conditions, we needed more children to 
cooperate (in order to have a chance to protest) in both conditions. Thus our 
aim in this study was not to measure children’s cooperation rates and replicate 
Study 1; rather, it was to see whether children who cooperated would protest 
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more following a communicative look than a non-communicative look. We 
conservatively focused on just one specific type of protest: normative protest 
referring, directly or indirectly, to the commitment (e.g., “You should have 
cooperated, because you told me you would”). We predicted that children in the 
communicative look condition would produce more of this specific type of 
protest than children in the non-communicative look condition. In addition, to 
zero in even more precisely on the role of the communicative look, children 
were only able to see the eye area of their partner during the critical decision-
making phase: At this point, the two partners looked at each other through a 
tube. 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants  
Seventy-two 6- to 7-year-olds (36 girls, mean age: 6;11; range: 6;4-7;3) 
were included in the final sample. We focused on children’s protests about their 
partner’s failure to cooperate; therefore, the final sample in both conditions was 
planned in advance to include only children who decided to cooperate and who 
thus had a reason to protest. Consequently, additional 15 children who played 
individually were excluded for this reason (8 in the non-communicative look 
and 7 in the communicative look condition). Additional children were tested 
but not included in the analyses for refusing to play the game (1), language 
comprehension difficulties (1), failing the second pre-test (2), and verbally or 
gesturally telling the experimenter how they would play during the critical 
decision-making phase (8). Participant recruitment was the same as in Study 1, 
except that children were tested in their schools. 
3.2.1.2   Materials  
The materials for the warm-up game included five pairs of different 
colored mats (30x20 cm) made of a thin, soft, rubbery material, which were 
placed on the ground, and a pack of cards (6x4 cm), each of which displayed 
two colors on the same side. The materials for the main game included a blue 
rectangular rug (170 x 140 x 170 cm) decorated with fish representing a lake, 
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and two low, yellow platforms decorated with palm trees representing the beach 
(see Figure 6). On the rug, there was a treasure box (20x26 cm) containing 
seven small containers. Inside each container were the big prizes: two different 
stickers of animals (4x4 cm). Between the two platforms, there was a tube (13 
cm diameter) attached to a tripod with two spy cameras inside to film children’s 
and their partner’s face. Small paper pictures of a bird (3x3 cm) were the small 
prizes. 
 
Figure 6. The setup of Study 2: the tube, the lake representing the cooperative 
option, and the beach representing the individual option. 
 
3.2.1.3   Procedure  
Warm up: The goal of the game was for children and E1 to jump to the 
same color mat on the floor. At the beginning of every trial, E2 picked a card 
from the pack and showed it to the child and E1. In every trial, E1 announced 
which of the two colors on the card they should jump on (“Let’s jump on 
green”). The child jumped first and then E1 followed. After three correct trials, 
in the next trial, E1 jumped on a different color than the one she announced. E2 
waited for the child’s reaction, and then he corrected E1 and encouraged 
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children to do the same whenever E1 made a mistake: “That [E1’s name]! 
Sometimes she does things wrong. Then you can tell her, ‘That was wrong! You 
should do what you say you will do.’” Three more correct trials were followed by 
one incorrect trial and then two additional correct trials at the end. If in this 
second incorrect trial children did not spontaneously correct E1 after she 
jumped to the wrong mat, E2 corrected her, the game continued, and children 
had two additional chances if needed to correct her. 
Training phase: E2 introduced the main game and explained to children 
and E1 that they could decide to play individually (i.e., sit on the platform 
representing the beach) and be certain of winning a bird picture (small prize). 
Alternatively, they could decide to play cooperatively (i.e., jump onto the rug 
representing the lake) and have the possibility of winning a colorful sticker (big 
prize), as long as both of them did this together.  
E2 adjusted the height of the tube according to the height of the child. E2 
showed and verbally explained to children and E1 that when deciding where to 
jump, both players had to stand on the starting positions and show a ‘thumbs-
up’ sign to each other through the tube as a signal that they were ready. Then 
they had to hold the tube with both hands, look at each other through the tube, 
and, while looking at each other, E1 would verbally suggest where they should 
go. Finally, E1 would count to three and clap her hands as a signal for children 
to decide what to do. When children and E1 played individually, E2 gave each of 
them a bird picture. When they played cooperatively, they opened the treasure 
box together, took out one container, and split the two stickers between them. 
In the first trial, they both played individually and in the second, they both 
played cooperatively. In the third trial, E2 instructed E1 to play cooperatively 
and children to play individually in order to demonstrate that when only one 
player played cooperatively, that player does not win a prize. After three 
training trials, as a first pre-test to see if children understood the rules, E2 
asked children, “What happens if you jump to the lake and [E1] doesn’t?” and 
“What happens if you jump to the lake and [E1] jumps as well?” If children did 
not answer correctly (i.e., in the former case, that they would not receive any 
prize, and in the latter case, that they would both receive stickers), E2 explained 
the game from the beginning, children and E1 repeated the same three training 
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trials, and E2 asked these questions one more time. By this stage all children 
understood the rules and answered these questions correctly. After that, 
children played a series of individual and cooperative trials interspersed with 
three ‘mismatch’ trials in which E1 announced, “Let’s jump to the lake, okay?” 
but after children jumped, E1 played individually, sitting on her platform. E2 
waited to see if children would say something about this spontaneously, and if 
not then he encouraged them to protest to E1 by saying, “You can tell her:  
What you did was wrong! You should do what you said you would do.” Then E2 
corrected E1 himself. These mismatch trials in the main game, together with the 
mismatch trials in the warm-up game, served as a second pre-test and were 
designed to ensure that children were not too shy to protest to an adult 
experimenter about her behavior. One might worry that through this training 
children might have learned that they should protest whenever their partner 
does not cooperate, or whenever she does not do what she said she would do. 
However, it is important to note that the training was identical in both 
conditions, and during the test phase E1 did not say anything, so this training 
cannot explain our results – it was conducted simply to increase children’s 
willingness to protest against the adult. To pass the second pre-test, children 
needed to correct E1 spontaneously at least once in the warm-up game (out of 
the four mismatch trials) and once in the main game (of the three mismatch 
trials).  
Test: The test consisted of three phases, as follows. 
Decision-making phase: After the training phase, E2 introduced a no-talking 
rule, telling children and E1 that from now on they were not allowed to talk 
while looking through the tube, although they could talk again after having 
jumped or sat on the beach. Then E2 moved away to write something down and 
E1 looked through the tube in such a way that children could see only her eye 
area. Although children could not see it, the corners of E1’s mouth were turned 
slightly upward to express a generally positive attitude in both conditions. In 
the non-communicative look condition, E1 made neutral eye contact with 
children for a few seconds. In the communicative look condition, E1 made eye 
contact with children with an ostensive-communicative look: She opened her 
eyes wide and raised her eyebrows (see Figure 7). After the look, E1 returned to 
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an upright position, counted to three, clapped her hands, and waited for 
children to make their decision, all the while with her gaze still directed 
neutrally toward the tube. After children had decided, in both conditions E1 
played individually. If children played individually, E2 gave them the small 
prize, and the test phase ended. 
 
a)                  b)                      c) 
 
 
Figure 7. A depiction of a) the non-communicative look, b) the communicative 
look, and c) the child’s face position. 
 
Spontaneous response phase: If children played cooperatively, they then had 30 
s to talk spontaneously to E1. E1 sat silently on the platform and looked at 
children with a slightly positive expression.  
Elicited response phase:  
 After 30 s, E2 returned and asked children five questions.  
1. “What happened, [child’s name]? Tell me.”  
2. “Did [E1] perhaps give you any sign that she would jump?” If children 
responded yes, E2 asked: “What sign did she give you?” 
3. “Do you want to say something about that to [E1]? Tell her what you 
think about what she just did. I’m sure she would be glad to know.” 
E1 nodded. 
Then E1 excused herself, left the room, and E2 continued: 
4. “Do you remember when you jumped to the lake and [E1] did not? 
What did you expect her to do?”  
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5. “Why did you expect that [E1] would jump to the lake/stay at the 
beach?” 
Debriefing: Then E1 returned and apologized for playing incorrectly. 
They played two successful cooperative trials together, after which children 
were thanked and taken back to class.  
3.2.1.4   Coding and reliability  
Sessions were videotaped and coded from the video recordings. A second 
independent observer, who was naive to the hypotheses of the study, coded a 
random sample of 25% of children in each condition for reliability. There was 
perfect agreement on all main measures. 
Cooperation vs. individual play: During the test trial, children’s 
behavior was coded either as cooperation, if they jumped onto the rug 
representing the lake, or as individual play, if they sat on the platform 
representing the beach. This was coded because we only included children who 
cooperated.   
Children’s spontaneous protest after their partner did not cooperate: 
Children’s verbal responses during the spontaneous response phase were 
transcribed, and we coded for protests that indicated that children understood 
E1’s look as a commitment to cooperate. Promissory commitments can arise 
when there is intentional communication to one’s partner about one’s intention 
to perform some action (Raz, 1977). We did not expect these young children to 
refer explicitly to commitments; instead, we focused on protests that involved 
what E1 had communicated that she would do. We decided to focus on this 
specific type of protest because we had found that in Study 1 the child who 
protested normatively in the communicative look condition referred implicitly 
to a communicated commitment. This decision was made before the data 
collection began. Normative protest referring, directly or indirectly, to the 
commitment was coded when children used normative vocabulary (e.g., 
“should,” “must,” “wrong”) and mentioned communication of any type 
(including verbal, gestural, with the eyes/looks, or with facial expressions, e.g., 
‘‘You should do what you said!’’ or “[E1], that was wrong. You should pay 
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attention to your sign.” This enabled us to focus on the commitment part of the 
protest, disentangling it from children’s general disappointment about the fact 
that their partner did not cooperate (e.g., “You should have cooperated, because 
I wanted the sticker”).   
Children’s protest across the entire response phase: Children’s verbal 
responses across the entire response phase (i.e., the spontaneous plus the 
elicited response phase) were also transcribed and coded for normative protest 
referring, directly or indirectly, to the commitment. This was coded when the 
child used normative vocabulary and mentioned communication either 
together in one utterance (e.g., “One does not do that, that was wrong; you 
should do what you said”) or separately across responses to different questions 
(e.g., if children said in the spontaneous response phase, “You did it wrong, I 
think,” and later responded to one of the questions, “She did this (the child 
raised her eyebrows), so I did this (the child raised her eyebrows) and because 
of that I understood that she would stand over the treasure so with that I 
understood ‘to the lake.’” 
Children’s contribution to the mutual look in the communicative look 
condition: We again investigated whether children who responded to their 
partner’s communicative looks (thus explicitly acknowledging their partner’s 
commitment and/or even making a joint commitment) were more likely to 
protest than children who did not. Children’s reactions to the communicative 
look were coded as: raising their eyebrows, nodding (after receiving the look 
from E1), or no communicative behaviors. For the analyses, a binary outcome 
variable – whether or not each child produced a communicative behavior – was 
used.  
Supplementary coding of children’s responses: To gain more 
information about children’s understanding of the critical test trial, we 
conducted more detailed coding of children’s verbal responses, both in the 
spontaneous and the elicited response phases. Children’s responses were 
transcribed and coded from the video recordings. All but two reliability 
measures revealed perfect agreement (range of Cohen’s κ’s=0.64-1). The two 
measures (Questions 1 and 6) with a Cohen’s κ of 0.64 each had only 1 
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disagreement out of 18, and these two disagreements were resolved by a third 
coder who was blind to condition.  
3.2.2 Results  
3.2.2.1   Children’s protest after their partner did not cooperate  
At test, more children in the communicative look condition produced 
normative protests referring to commitment than did children in the non-
communicative look condition, both in the spontaneous phase alone 
(marginally; Fisher’s exact test, p=0.06; odds ratio=3.13) and when their 
responses across the entire response phase were considered (Fisher’s exact test, 
p=0.01; odds ratio=4.38). In the communicative look condition, 39% of 
children protested spontaneously and 47% protested at least once across the 
entire response phase. In contrast, in the non-communicative look condition, 
17% of children protested, both in the spontaneous part and across the entire 
response phase.  
3.2.2.2 Children’s contribution to the mutual look in the communicative look 
condition  
Children who responded with communicative behaviors to E1 tended to 
be more likely to protest than children who did not (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.08; 
odds ratio=4.20). Forty-seven percent of children in the communicative look 
condition showed some communicative behaviors (see Table 3). Of these 
children, 69% protested. In contrast, of the children who did not show any such 
behaviors, only 33% protested.  
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Table 3 
Children’s Communicative Behaviors During the Mutual Look in the 
Communicative Look Condition and Their Relation to Children’s Protesting in 
Study 2. 
Note:  N=34. Due to a technical error, four videos were missing. E1 noticed the 
technical failure in two cases and noted live whether children showed any 
communicative behavior or not. These two cases are included in the table. 
 
3.2.2.3 Supplementary coding of children’s responses 
We used the same coding for children’s spontaneous responses and their 
responses to the first question, “What happened, [child’s name]? Tell me” and 
the third question, “Do you want to say something about that to [E1’s name]? 
Tell her what you think about what she just did. I’m sure she would be glad to 
know that.”  Children’s verbal responses were coded for normative protests 
referring to commitment. For exploratory purposes, children who did not 
produce this specific type of protest were additionally given one of the following 
hierarchically-ordered codes: (a) Normative protest without reference to 
commitment: Children used normative vocabulary but did not refer to 
commitment (e.g., “You must come with me in the lake!” or “You did it wrong, I 
 
Normative protests 
referring to 
commitment 
No normative 
protests referring 
to commitment 
Communicative behaviors 11 5 
Raised eyebrows 10 4 
Nodding 1 0 
Raised eyebrows and nodding 0 1 
No communicative 
behaviors 
6 12 
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think.”), (b) Communication only: The child mentioned communication of any 
type (including verbal, gestural, with the eyes/looks, or with facial expressions), 
but did not use normative language (e.g., “[E1’s name], you said that we would 
jump into the lake!”), (c) Interrupted normative protest: Children started to 
protest using normative vocabulary but did not finish the sentence (e.g., “You 
should…[and then the child stopped],” or “[E1’s name], you must do…”), (d) 
Other: The child was silent or did not produce a response falling into any of the 
above categories. The percentage of children whose responses fell into each of 
these categories is shown in Table 4. Most children in both conditions did not 
respond to these questions with any type of protest; nor did they mention 
communication.  
For the second question, “Did she (E1) maybe give you any sign that she 
would jump?”/“What sign did she give you?”) and the fifth question, “Why did 
you expect that [E1] would jump to the lake/stay at the beach?”, children’s 
responses were categorized according to whether or not they mentioned 
communication (defined in the same way as above). Children in the 
communicative look condition mentioned communication in their answers to 
the second question significantly more often than children in the non-
communicative look condition (28% vs. 3%, respectively; Fisher’s exact test, 
p<0.01; odds ratio=13.06). A similar difference was found in children’s answers 
to the fifth question: More children in the communicative look condition 
tended to mention communication there as well (19% vs. 3%, respectively; 
Fisher’s exact test, p=0.06; odds ratio=8.24).  
Children’s responses to the fourth question, “Do you remember when 
you jumped to the lake and [E1] did not? What did you expect her to do?”, were 
coded as: (a) Cooperation: Children answered that they expected E1 to 
cooperate (e.g., to jump, to go to the lake, to jump together), (b) Individual 
play: Children answered that they expected E1 to play individually (e.g., to stay 
on the beach, not to jump), (c) Do not know, or (d) Other. The game was set up 
in such a way that children in both conditions were likely to expect cooperation 
from E1 and therefore to cooperate themselves. The final sample included only 
children who cooperated, however with this question we were interested in 
looking at children’s explicit verbal expectations in both conditions. In both 
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conditions, 75% of children answered that they expected cooperation from E1. 
This shows that children in the non-communicative look condition had 
expectations about E1’s behavior as well.  
At the very end of the procedure, after E1 apologized and played two 
successful cooperation trials with children, E2 asked the final question, “Are 
you [still] angry that [E1] did not always do what she said?” Children’s 
responses were coded as: (a) Yes: Children answered positively or said that they 
were angry just a little bit, or (b) No: Children answered that they were not 
angry. The results showed that almost no children were angry at E1 at the end 
of the play session (97% in the communicative look condition and 92% in the 
non-communicative look condition said that they were not angry). 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Children Who Showed Each Type of Verbal Response in Study 2. 
Verbal response types during each response phase Communicative 
look condition 
 
Non-
communicative 
look condition 
Spontaneous response   
Normative protest referring to commitment 39% 17% 
Normative protest without reference to commitment 8% 19% 
Communication only 0% 3% 
Interrupted normative protest 3% 6% 
Other 50% 56% 
“What happened?”        
Normative protest referring to commitment 0% 0% 
Normative protest without reference to commitment 0% 3% 
Communication only 11% 0% 
Interrupted normative protest 0% 0% 
Other 89% 97% 
“Do you want to say something about that to [E1]?” 
Normative protest referring to commitment 3% 0% 
Normative protest without reference to commitment 8% 8% 
Communication only 3% 0% 
Interrupted normative protest 0% 0% 
Other 86% 92% 
Total (across all phases) normative protest 
referring to commitment7 
47% 17% 
                                                   
7 For the communicative look condition, this includes two children who used normative 
vocabulary and referred to the commitment in different phases. 
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3.2.3 Discussion of Study 2 
At the moment of decision-making, children’s partner engaged in 
communicative or non-communicative eye contact with them and subsequently 
did not cooperate. Children who received a communicative look were more 
likely to protest about this, referring specifically to their partner’s commitment, 
than children who received a non-communicative look. The vast majority of 
these children referred explicitly to “doing what you said [you would do],” but 
three children referred to nonverbal signs E1 had given (e.g., a certain kind of 
look). This suggests that children understood the communicative look as a 
binding statement from their partner in which she committed herself to 
choosing the cooperative option in the game.  
It is interesting to note that approximately half of the children responded 
to E1's communicative look with looks (or other communicative behavior) of 
their own. One possible low-level interpretation of this behavior is that children 
automatically mimicked E1’s communicative look. A second, more plausible 
interpretation is that children intentionally sent a communicative message back 
to E1. Two pieces of evidence support the latter interpretation. First, some 
children mentioned their own responses in their answers to E2’s questions, 
(e.g., “She [E1] did this [the child raised her eyebrows], so I did this [the child 
raised her eyebrows] so I understood...”). Second, the results showed that 
children who produced these nonverbal signs themselves tended to be more 
likely to protest. It is likely that these signs served at least to acknowledge the 
partner’s commitment to cooperate and, perhaps, in addition, to commit 
children themselves to cooperating too, thus forming a joint commitment. 
Either way, however, their partner did not fulfill her commitment, and thus 
children were entitled to protest.   
3.3 Part II discussion 
When deciding whether or not to cooperate, we are often faced with two 
challenges: uncertainty about our partner’s knowledge and uncertainty about 
their future behavior. Here we investigated one key nonverbal way of 
overcoming these challenges. Children who received a communicative, as 
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compared to a non-communicative, look when deciding whether to cooperate 
both cooperated more (Study 1) and normatively protested more when their 
partner did not cooperate (Study 2). Thus, a communicative look can be 
powerful enough not only to promote expectations of cooperation but also to 
signal a commitment. This is the first empirical evidence, in adults or children, 
suggesting that nonverbal signals can be understood as commitments. 
In Study 1, we focused on the uncertainty we may have about our 
partner’s knowledge (in this case about the availability of the cooperative 
option). We demonstrated that the type of eye contact made influenced 
children’s decisions to cooperate. Wyman et al. (2013) had previously shown 
that a communicative look increased young children’s cooperation as well. 
However, our study goes beyond theirs in isolating precisely what it is that 
established knowledge in common about the cooperative option and led 
children to cooperate: the communicativeness of the look. Intentionally 
communicative eye contact not only transmits information from one social 
partner to another, but also provides an indication of where each partner’s 
attention is focused, and thus removes any doubt about whether the partners 
are paying attention to the same thing and to each other (Carpenter & Liebal, 
2011; Gómez, 1994). It thus creates a public space between the partners, 
enabling them to focus on something together (Gilbert, 2007).  
Therefore, here we add a new type of information that children can use 
to solve the knowledge problem in coordination problems. Previous studies 
have shown that 5-year-old children are able to solve different coordination 
problems by using salience (Grueneisen et al., 2015a), majority information 
(Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015b), and their partners’ cultural 
knowledge (Goldvicht-Bacon & Diesendruck, 2016). Study 1 extends these 
findings by focusing on interpersonal signals that children can use in solving 
coordination problems.  
 In Study 2, we focused on the second challenge for successful 
cooperation involving uncertainty about one’s partner’s behavior. We found 
that after receiving a communicative look, children understood that their 
partner was committing herself to cooperate. Previous studies have all involved 
children’s understanding of verbal promises and commitments (Gräfenhain et 
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al., 2009; Kachel et al., 2017; Kanngiesser et al., 2017). Here we showed that a 
nonverbal communicative signal can be understood as a commitment as well. 
Thus, along with contributing to the psychological literature by demonstrating 
that young children can normatively evaluate a nonverbal communicative 
signal as a binding statement, we also contribute to the theoretical debate in the 
philosophical literature, by showing that it is indeed possible to make a 
promissory commitment nonverbally. Even though a communicative look is not 
a conventionalized way of committing oneself, children still protested 
normatively and referred to a commitment (e.g., mentioning ‘doing what you 
said you would do’) after their partner looked at them communicatively but did 
not cooperate. This finding supports the more contemporary accounts of 
promissory obligations (Gilbert, 2004; Owens, 2006; Scanlon, 1998; Shiffrin, 
2008) that argue that the core of promissory commitments might not be rooted 
in social convention (as Hume, 1739-1740/1969, Rawls, 1955, & Searle, 1969, 
have proposed).  
One might wonder whether the communicative look signaled a 
promissory commitment in the strict sense, with normative obligations and 
rights involved, or rather only a more minimal ‘sense of commitment’ (Michael, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2015). We argue for the former interpretation. All the 
children in Study 2 had decided to cooperate and in both conditions 75% of 
children answered to a post-test question that they had expected cooperation 
from their partner. This shows that children in the non-communicative look 
condition had explicit expectations about cooperation as well. However, after 
receiving a communicative look, around half of the children not only felt that 
they had the right to protest against their partner when she did not cooperate, 
but also often referred specifically in their protests to what she had said she 
would do. One might argue that children still did not understand their partner’s 
nonverbal message as a binding statement committing her to cooperate. 
However, it does not seem plausible that intentional communication in this 
context can be perceived as an informative but non-binding statement at the 
same time (e.g., “I will cooperate, but I do not promise”).  
The communicative look could signal a commitment because children 
and their partner had the common ground that during the decision-making 
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phase they were deciding whether to cooperate. This common ground 
supported their interpretation of the look. The most relevant – and the only 
missing piece of – information when children saw the look was about whether 
E1 had seen the cooperative option (Study 1) or whether she was going to 
cooperate (Study 1 and 2). In fact, the difference in context and the most 
relevant information in the situation could explain why children apparently 
interpreted the communicative look differently in the two studies. In Study 1, 
children and their partner already had common ground about the payoff 
structure of the game: They knew together that the cooperative option had a 
higher payoff, but that it was risky, because if one partner decided for 
cooperation alone, she would lose the chance to gain anything. However, there 
was uncertainty created by the partial occluder about whether the partner could 
see the cooperative option or not. Children might thus have interpreted the 
communicative look as “I see it!”, which then led them to expect cooperation 
but not necessarily to hold their partner normatively responsible for not 
cooperating. In contrast, in Study 2, children and their partner not only had 
common ground about the payoff structure but also about the availability of the 
cooperative option, so the most relevant information during the decision-
making phase was about the decision to cooperate or not. Therefore, children 
likely interpreted the look as directly related to deciding whether to cooperate 
and the communicative look could signal a commitment. This might be one 
main reason why children protested only in Study 2, not in Study 1. 
There are likely several other reasons why children protested in Study 2, 
and not in Study 1. First, in Study 2 there were several training rounds to 
ensure that children were not too shy to protest to an adult experimenter about 
her behavior. Thus, it is possible that in Study 2 children felt more confident 
about blaming their partner for the coordination’s failure. Second, in Study 2 
we tested older children (6- to 7-year-olds) than in Study 1 (5-year-olds). Thus, 
children’s developing understanding of social norms (see, e.g., Smith et al., 
2013) might have contributed to our findings. Even 3-year-olds protest when 
their partner intentionally performs a task incorrectly (Kachel et al., 2017) or 
violates simple game rules (Rakoczy et al., 2008), but in our studies children 
faced an arguably much more challenging task. In a Stag Hunt game, the fact 
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that the partner played individually is not in itself an incorrect or wrong action, 
so children could not refer to any rule of the game in their protests. Instead, 
what was wrong was that their partner intentionally made children believe that 
she would cooperate, but then did not follow through. As she did all this 
nonverbally, it might be that only older children could formulate this in their 
protests. The relation between children’s developing understanding of norms 
and nonverbal commitments, as well as the question of whether even younger 
children also understand nonverbal commitments, are two important questions 
for future research. Even infants can infer some types of information from 
ostensive-communicative eye contact (Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Senju & Csibra, 
2008), but we would only expect children to show the same pattern of protest 
results once they have reached an age at which they understand something 
about norms and commitments, around 3 years of age (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; 
Rakoczy et al., 2008). 
It is interesting to note that looks do not have the specificity that 
language has, but this is not a problem here, because the certainty connected to 
a specific meaning just needs to be sufficient for the current purposes 
(Monderer & Samet, 1989). It is an open question in this regard whether 
sharing attention via nonverbal signals can fulfill all the same functions in 
creating expectations and signaling commitments as sharing attention via 
verbal signals, or whether under certain conditions (e.g., when the risk is too 
high, for example risking one’s life), we might hesitate to rely on nonverbal 
signals. Future research should manipulate the risk-to-reward ratio to 
investigate this. Similarly, it would be interesting to compare the effectiveness 
of increasingly specific nonverbal signals (from just looking to smiling and/or 
winking and/or pointing and/or nodding) in promoting coordination success 
and creating commitments, and to study this cross-culturally to see if children 
in different cultures vary in their normative understanding of communicative 
signals with various degrees of explicitness.  
In summary, these studies are the first to show that the subtle, nonverbal 
cue of a communicative look – but not a non-communicative look – can be a 
powerful tool for increasing coordination success in social dilemmas. In the 
context of a key coordination dilemma, communicative looks at the critical 
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decision-making phase produced an expectation of collaboration in 5-year-old 
children, and 6- to 7-year-old children apparently even understood the 
communicative looks as a commitment to cooperate. The ability to produce 
communicative looks, infer their meaning, and make commitments nonverbally 
might have been important steps in the evolution of action coordination in 
humans. These skills would have enabled successful coordination even before 
language evolved.  
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4. General discussion 
Humans differ from other animals in the extent to which they shift from 
independent experience to interconnected experience of the world. We are not 
only sensitive to our social partner’s focus of attention, but we are able to attend 
to things, events, and ideas together and to adapt our behavior accordingly. 
Coordination of attention and knowledge states with others is one of the 
foundations of the social and cooperative nature of humans (Tomasello & 
Carpenter, 2007).  
The present thesis explored the ways in which we coordinate our 
attention with others and how this supports cooperation. First, in order to help 
resolve the problem of lack of consensus in the literature about what joint 
attention is, in the first part of the thesis I proposed a new framework of 
different social attention levels and corresponding knowledge state levels. More 
specifically, I systematically discussed cognitive, behavioral, and 
phenomenological aspects of the different levels. In monitoring attention, one 
takes a third-person’s perspective and monitors the other’s attention to 
something, for example by gaze following. In common attention, by taking a 
third-person perspective and making recursive inferences, each partner is 
aware that they are both attending to the same thing as well as to each other’s 
attention to the thing. In mutual attention, partners engage in a second-person 
perspective. They both experience each other attending to the same thing and 
their attention to each other, for example by making eye contact about the 
thing. In shared attention, in addition to the conditions of mutual attention, 
partners actively share attention by communicating about the object of their 
attention. The framework demonstrates that joint attention is not a single 
cognitive skill. It also emphasizes the need to investigate attention and 
knowledge states together, as they are closely intertwined: when partners 
engage in these attention levels, they have qualitatively different knowledge 
states. The idea is that the social attention and knowledge state levels serve 
distinct functions and support different types of social interactions. Although 
all the levels have the potential to promote cooperation, the framework 
highlights the special importance of the shared attention level in this.  
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In the second part of the thesis I investigated the role of shared attention 
in supporting cooperation. In two empirical studies, young children played a 
coordination game in which they needed to decide whether to cooperate or play 
individually. The children's partner made either communicative eye contact or 
looked non-communicatively at them before their decision. In Study 1, results 
showed that communicative eye contact produced an expectation of 
collaboration in children. In Study 2, results showed that children normatively 
protested when their partner did not cooperate. These findings support the idea 
that sharing attention via communicative, but not non-communicative, eye 
contact can help social partners to achieve successful coordination. 
Communicative eye contact served as a powerful coordination tool for children 
facing a coordination dilemma. First, it established shared knowledge about the 
availability of the cooperative option, and therefore shared knowledge about the 
possibility of choosing the cooperative option. Second, it decreased uncertainty 
about their partner’s future behavior as it helped to align their expectations, to 
create a commitment to cooperate, and to establish the right to complain if the 
other did not cooperate. 
In the following section, first I summarize how the social attention and 
knowledge levels support cooperation and suggest that levels with a higher 
degree of jointness bring additional benefits for cooperation. Then I turn to new 
questions and propose directions for future research. Finally, I conclude with 
remarks about why it is beneficial to further investigate different types of social 
attention. 
4.1  Social attention and knowledge states support cooperation 
Coordination of attention and knowledge states with others enables 
better ways of cooperating. Action coordination is more effective, and it also 
allows a more complex type of coordination to emerge: strategic coordination. 
In coordination dilemmas, partners need to decide how to act based on their 
expectations of what others will do. They must overcome two types of 
uncertainty: first, uncertainty about their knowledge (e.g., knowledge about the 
presence of a collaborative option), and second, uncertainty about their 
partner’s behavior (e.g., whether their partner will choose the collaborative 
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option). Shared knowledge helps to solve the former type of uncertainty, and it 
enables the formation of expectations and commitments, which help to solve 
the latter type.  
Different attention and knowledge levels support the commitments and 
obligations, and the higher degree of jointness the levels have, the stronger the 
support they provide. This is the case for several reasons. First, higher degrees 
of jointness establish more certainty for social partners. For example, in the 
levels with lower degrees of jointness (monitoring and common attention) 
partners have to consider the other’s attentional state, but in the levels with a 
higher degree of jointness (mutual and shared attention) the direct contact 
gives them immediate evidence that they are paying attention to each other 
(Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; Gómez, 1996). Second, in the level with lowest 
degree of jointness (monitoring attention), partners can only produce unilateral 
knowledge about the partner’s focus of attention (e.g., she sees the collaborative 
option) and a unilateral expectation about the partner’s behavior. However, the 
levels with a higher degree of jointness (common, mutual, and shared 
attention) can produce knowledge in common about their focus of attention 
(e.g., we see the collaborative option). In addition, the expectations about the 
partner’s probable behavior could become knowledge in common between 
partners as well. This might cause partners to feel some sense of minimal 
commitment to fulfill these expectations (J. Michael, personal communication, 
January 15, 2018). The openness in the mutual and shared levels heightens the 
pressure to fulfill these expectations beyond the common level. Third, as it is 
difficult to plausibly deny that attention and knowledge are shared in the level 
with the highest degree of jointness, shared attention, in normative contexts 
can give rise to commitments and obligations.  
Interestingly, the distinction between second-person and third-person 
ways of achieving knowledge in common may link to dual process theories of 
social cognition. These theories propose that there are two different kinds of 
mental processes: processes that are automatic, fast, efficient, and less 
cognitively demanding, and processes that are controlled, slower, and 
cognitively effortful (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2008; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Empirical research is needed to clarify the 
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nature of processing in the second- versus third- person levels and to answer 
the question about their ontogenetic and phylogenetic primacy or co-
development. 
4.2 Future directions 
The presented findings have opened up new questions for future 
research. One useful contribution of the theoretical part of the thesis is the scale 
of jointness idea and discussion of.  It is interesting to note that several factors 
that influence different aspects of jointness differ significantly across different 
societies, for instance, the degree of interdependency between social partners, 
the frequency of face-to-face interactions, the focus of attention on oneself vs. 
others, the sensitivity to interpersonal and contextual cues, and the importance 
of indirect vs. direct communication styles. These factors might influence when 
people choose to engage in different levels, which specific behaviors they use, 
and what are the normative consequences of these levels. Future studies are 
needed to elucidate the specific roles of these factors in different societies. 
These studies would not only help us to generalize the findings presented in this 
thesis but also to improve our understanding of how individuals from different 
societies can cooperate more effectively. 
Although the framework does not presuppose that social partners can 
engage in the different levels only when they are physically co-present, the 
examples used to illustrate the levels, as well as the two empirical studies, 
focused on the context in which the partners were in the same place at the same 
time. An interesting topic for future work would be to explore the role of shared 
attention in cooperation without physical co-presence, for example in virtual 
environments (e.g., using social media, messaging platforms, emails). We have 
started to rely on virtual environments to a greater extent than ever before. 
When partners are co-present, they can co-create their experience by 
bidirectional influence and quickly align their mental states about the co-
attended object. In virtual environments, certainty about shared attention and 
knowledge might be decreased, because the contact between partners is 
restricted. For example, when using video call apps, it is harder to interpret the 
other’s reactions (e.g., is the gaze away related to what I am saying or to some 
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distraction behind screen). In messaging apps, the contact is delayed in time 
and there is typically no simultaneous confirmation that both partners read the 
message. Therefore, it would be useful to test whether the social attention levels 
in virtual environments, compared to real environments, are equally effective in 
supporting communication and cooperation and which behaviors are especially 
beneficial to support smooth and mistake-free episodes of shared attention in 
virtual environments. 
Another promising line of research would be to study the role of the 
social attention levels in facilitating prosocial behavior. It would be interesting 
to explore to what extent normative forces to behave prosocially are influenced 
by the different attention and knowledge levels. To illustrate: a young man is 
sitting in a tram and he sees an injured person enters the tram. He knows that 
he should offer his seat. It is likely that levels with higher degrees of jointness 
increase prosocial behavior. This might be the case because plausible 
deniability that the young man does not know that his help is needed differs 
between the levels. All levels with knowledge in common might facilitate young 
man’s perceived obligation to get up over monitoring attention (with individual 
knowledge). In a recent study, we found that the probability of young children’s 
helping in a similar situation was higher in common attention (children and an 
injured experimenter had common knowledge about the fact that children’s 
help is needed) compared to monitoring attention (children knew individually 
that their help is needed) (Siposova, Grueneisen, Helming, Tomasello, & 
Carpenter, in prep.). Moreover, differences might exist even between the 
common, mutual and shared level. Future studies could manipulate the 
jointness about the need for help and measure whether it affects prosociality. 
For example, in all conditions the participant having a seat can see that an 
injured person needs a seat, what varies is which attention levels the participant 
engages in. The crucial measure is whether and to what extent the participant 
provides help.  
4.3 Conclusion 
Mutual understanding and efficient coordination are the building blocks 
of flourishing societies; they make the difference between failure and success in 
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dyads, groups, organizations, and nations. Therefore, it is important to 
investigate the underlying processes that make them possible and the 
conditions under which they can thrive. The ability to engage in different social 
attention levels and achieve corresponding knowledge states is crucial, as it 
allows us to focus on things together in different ways. Especially useful is the 
shared attention level, characterized by bidirectional and communicative co-
creation of experience. By further studying social attention levels, we might 
advance our understanding of the key features that make us especially social, 
sharing and cooperating species. 
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